股权众筹融资中的最优回报方案研究

发布时间：2018-05-20 21:54

本文选题：众筹融资 + 回报方案　；参考：《北京外国语大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着信息通信技术的高速发展以及互联网金融的不断创新,众筹这一新兴的融资方式为中小企业和创业者解决融资难问题提供了新思路。众筹的发展允许一些有创意的企业通过互联网发起公众筹资,同时也为普通大众提供了更多投资机会,实现资金的优化配置。虽然近几年在国内外,众筹融资模式都有了快速的发展,但是在国内众筹融资模式还处于本土化阶段,相关法律法规的制定及众筹平台的建设还不够完善。有关众筹方面的学术研究层出不穷,通过总结发现,主要是基于众筹平台数据的实证研究,而关于众筹融资过程的数理分析较为缺乏。因此,本文从众筹融资过程中的筹资者、投资者和众筹融资平台出发,通过建立他们的效用和收益函数,研究不同参与主体众筹融资过程中的博弈,并最终实现效用或收益的最大化。在模型的拓展中,分析了阙值机制下,众筹项目发起者所采纳的不同的回报方案,以及不同方案对投资者决策的影响,旨在为筹资者选择最优的激励方案提供理论依据;另外还对投资者效用函数中的个人回报进行拓展。研究结果显示:(1)众筹融资过程涉及的三大融资主体——筹资者、投资者和众筹融资平台,具有相容的激励,他们都希望吸引更多潜在投资者参与众筹活动,提高融资金额总量,三者在融资过程中的利益并不存在冲突。(2)由于众筹融资模式的阙值机制,投资者在效用最大化的投资额无法使项目最终成立的情况下,有意愿牺牲部分效用,加大投资金额,使项目最终成立。(3)当融资目标值确定时,众筹项目筹资者可以通过调整众筹方案中的回报系数,从而改变投资者的决策,最终促成众筹项目取得成功,并获取最大化收益。(4)当个人回报为二次型时,能够激励投资者加大投资金额,使得筹资者能够获取更高的收益。本文在最后结合我国众筹发展的现状,以研究结果为理论依据,为众筹融资过程三大主体分别提出了建设性建议。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of information and communication technology and the continuous innovation of Internet finance, crowdfunding provides a new way for SMEs and entrepreneurs to solve the financing problem. The development of crowdfunding allows some creative companies to launch public fundraising via the Internet, while also providing more investment opportunities for the general public to optimize the allocation of funds. Although in recent years, the mode of crowdfunding has developed rapidly at home and abroad, but in the domestic mode of crowdfunding is still in the localization stage, the formulation of relevant laws and regulations and the construction of crowdfunding platform is not perfect. There are many academic researches on crowdfunding. It is found that the empirical research is mainly based on the data of crowdfunding platform, but the mathematical analysis of crowdfunding process is lacking. Therefore, this paper studies the game in the process of crowdfunding of different participants by establishing their utility and income function, starting from the financing platform of crowdfunding, investors and crowdfunding in the process of raising funds by crowdfunding, and by establishing their utility and income functions, this paper studies the game in the process of crowdfunding of different participants. And the ultimate realization of utility or revenue maximization. In the development of the model, this paper analyzes the different return schemes adopted by the sponsors of multi-funding projects under the threshold mechanism, as well as the influence of different schemes on investors' decision-making, in order to provide the theoretical basis for the financiers to choose the optimal incentive schemes. In addition, the investors utility function in the personal return on the expansion. The research results show that the three major financing players involved in the crowdfunding process, the investors and the crowdfunding platform, have compatible incentives. They all want to attract more potential investors to participate in crowdfunding activities and increase the total amount of financing. There is no conflict between the interests of the three in the financing process. (2) because of the threshold mechanism of the mode of crowdfunding, investors are willing to sacrifice some utility and increase the amount of investment when the investment of utility maximization cannot make the project finally set up. When the financing target value is determined, the crowdfunding project financier can change the investor's decision by adjusting the return coefficient in the crowdfunding scheme, and ultimately contribute to the success of the crowdfunding project. When the personal return is quadratic, it can encourage investors to increase the amount of investment, so that the financier can obtain higher returns. In the end, according to the current situation of the development of crowdfunding in China, and based on the theoretical basis of the research results, this paper puts forward some constructive suggestions for the three main bodies in the process of crowdfunding.
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F832.51

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