中国零售商买方势力的福利效应研究

发布时间：2018-06-24 20:33

本文选题：买方垄断势力 + 买方抗衡势力　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着中国零售业市场集中度的提高,零售商在上下游市场的地位大幅上升,有限的货架空间和对消费者偏好有效的掌握使得零售商逐渐积聚起买方势力,能够对供应商实行直接或间接控制,通过收取通道费、要求大量销售折扣、签订排他性协议等手段对供应商进行压榨,并不断降低售价获得更大的市场份额,使边缘零售商的利润空间遭到压缩。本文通过最高限估计法对中国零售市场福利损失进行了测算,发现中国零售商确实利用买方势力并造成了社会福利损失。在反垄断法颁布以来,该损失仍然呈现上升趋势。鉴于此,政府应该有效规制大型零售商滥用买方势力的行为。本文认为市场结构不同,零售商具有的买方势力以及所造成的社会福利损失也不同。本文依循S-C-P研究框架对市场结构进行了细分,以供应商是否具有卖方势力为标准,将买方势力分为买方垄断势力和买方抗衡势力,进而结合中国供应商市场现状得到结论,中国大型零售商买方垄断势力和抗衡势力同时并存。再次,为了能够更为清晰的了解不同买方势力对市场造成的影响,构建博弈模型进行理论分析并得出:主导零售商具有买方垄断势力时,福利损失的程度相对更大,但是当增加主导零售商数量和促进各方有效竞争时能够减少损失;当主导零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,随着抗衡势力的提高,能够提高消费者福利,并且在有效控制边缘零售商的条件下可以进一步改善经济效率。
[Abstract]:With the increasing concentration of retail market in China, the position of retailers in the upstream and downstream markets has increased significantly. The limited shelf space and effective grasp of consumer preferences make retailers gradually accumulate the power of buyers. Able to exert direct or indirect control over suppliers by charging passage fees, demanding large sales discounts, signing exclusive agreements and other means to squeeze suppliers, and continuously reducing prices to gain a larger market share. Reduce margins for marginal retailers. This paper calculates the welfare loss of Chinese retail market by the maximum limit estimation method, and finds that Chinese retailers do make use of the buyer's power and cause the social welfare loss. Since the promulgation of the anti-monopoly law, the loss is still on the rise. In view of this, the government should effectively regulate the abuse of buyer power by large retailers. This paper argues that different market structure, retailers have different buyer power and social welfare losses. According to the S-C-P research framework, this paper subdivides the market structure, taking whether the supplier has the seller's power as the standard, divides the buyer's power into the buyer's monopoly power and the buyer's counterweight power, and then obtains the conclusion according to the Chinese supplier's market situation. The buyer's monopoly power and the countervailing power of large retailers in China coexist at the same time. Thirdly, in order to understand the influence of different buyer's power on the market more clearly, we build a game model to analyze and draw the conclusion: when the dominant retailer has the monopoly power of buyer, the degree of welfare loss is relatively greater. However, when increasing the number of leading retailers and promoting effective competition between parties, losses can be reduced; when leading retailers have buyer countervailing power, with the increase of countervailing power, consumers' welfare can be improved. Furthermore, the economic efficiency can be further improved under the condition of effective control of marginal retailers.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F724.2

【参考文献】