政府管制下建筑节能服务公司与业主策略行为的进化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-01-05 20:43

本文关键词：政府管制下建筑节能服务公司与业主策略行为的进化博弈分析　出处：《科技管理研究》2016年09期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：建筑节能服务产业是推动我国既有建筑节能改造工作的重要组成部分,然而目前建筑节能服务质量有待提高和市场需求不足阻碍了建筑节能服务公司(Energy Service Company,简称ESCO)的发展。运用进化博弈理论,建立无政府奖励和有政府奖励条件下参与节能改造的ESCO与业主复制动态模型,分析其行为的动态演变过程,探讨其博弈结果的稳定性。研究得出结论:政府前期激励政策可促进节能服务主体积极参与到节能服务市场中;后期主要通过合适的奖励额度引导市场主体提高节能服务质量,为市场健康有序发展提供保障。最后提出促进建筑节能服务公司发展的措施。
[Abstract]:Building energy-saving service industry is an important part of promoting the energy-saving transformation of existing buildings in China. However, at present, the service quality of building energy saving needs to be improved and the market demand is insufficient, which hinders the building energy saving service company, Energy Service Company. Based on evolutionary game theory, the dynamic model of ESCO and owner replicating under the condition of anarchic reward and government reward is established, and the dynamic evolution process of its behavior is analyzed. The stability of the game result is discussed. The conclusion is drawn: the government's early incentive policy can promote the active participation of the main body of energy-saving service in the energy-saving service market; In the later period, it mainly guides the main body of the market to improve the quality of energy-saving service through the appropriate incentive quota, and provides the guarantee for the healthy and orderly development of the market. Finally, the measures to promote the development of the building energy-saving service company are put forward.
【作者单位】：天津城建大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“工程质量政府监督多层次激励协同机理研究”(71171141) 住房和城乡建设部软科学研究计划项目“既有建筑节能改造市场培育机制及其发展政策究”(2013-R1-14)
【分类号】：F426.92;F224.32
【正文快照】： 截止到2012年底,我国既有建筑面积已达近500亿m2,但仅87.2万m2进行过节能改造且获得绿色建筑标识[1],绝大部分非节能建筑存在资源消耗高和环境污染严重问题,严重制约着我国经济发展战略的实施。既有建筑节能改造成为我国建设资源节约型和环境友好型社会的重要战略任务,而促进

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