环境污染排放限额制度下的政企博弈分析与实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-21 00:48

本文关键词： 排放限额硬性限额软性限额政企博弈　出处：《合肥工业大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：环境污染排放限额制度是一种广泛使用的环境政策工具,但在实际执行过程中往往难以取得令人满意的效果。其原因之一就是企业相对于政府拥有信息优势(企业的成本为私人信息),这使得企业有充足的动机利用此优势为其自身争取更加宽松的政策环境(即较小的环保压力)。文章以此为出发点,尝试建立排放限额制度在信息不对称条件下的政企动态博弈模型,根据排放限额实施过程中不同变量的决策顺序不同,将排放限额分为软性限额与硬性限额,进而分析政企双方在其中的行为模式。同时,通过实证对信息不对称与企业环境压力之间的关系进行分析。具体而言,分别从行业与企业的角度收集数据,采用环境规制强度和国企比例作为行业层面环境压力和信息不对称程度的度量,采用企业排污费占管理费用比重和环境信息披露程度作为企业层面环境压力和信息不对称程度的度量,分别考察两个层面中变量之间的关系。最后,在理论分析与实证的基础上,根据既有模型提出一个改进的政府博弈方案,以使政府弥补信息不对称导致的排放限额制度的失效。文章的理论模型显示,当政府只能依靠企业的自觉汇报与名义账目调查来推测企业成本时,企业有足够的动机误导政府,以使政府设置更为宽松的限额。行业层面的实证认为,行业的国有企业占比与该行业的环境规制相对强度呈正相关关系,即政府很可能对国企的强力掌握收集了更准确的信息,从而在拥有大量国企的行业中制定了相对严苛的限额。企业层面的实证认为,环境信息披露程度较高的企业,其排污费占管理费用的比例也较高,从而信息不对称程度的减弱可能使企业(至少是上市公司)不得不面临较大的环保支出。最后的改进博弈方案认为,在不考虑更换政策工具的前提下,政府如果对信息不对称束手无策,则理论上可以采用一种混合策略,即政府可以以一定的概率采用软性限额,且将最终所要采取的监管形式事先保密,直到企业支付了环保投资才对其公布。政府通过这种方法可以获得更小的社会成本期望值。
[Abstract]:Environmental pollution emission limitation system is a widely used environmental policy tool. However, it is difficult to achieve satisfactory results in the actual implementation process. One of the reasons is that enterprises have information advantages over the government (the cost of enterprises is private information). This gives enterprises ample incentive to take advantage of this advantage to fight for a more relaxed policy environment for themselves (that is, less environmental pressure). This is the starting point of the article. This paper attempts to establish a dynamic game model of government and enterprise under the condition of asymmetric information. According to the different decision order of different variables in the implementation of emission quota, the emission limit can be divided into soft limit and hard limit. At the same time, through empirical analysis of the relationship between information asymmetry and enterprise environmental pressure. Specifically, from the perspective of industry and enterprises to collect data. The intensity of environmental regulation and the proportion of state-owned enterprises are used as the measurement of environmental pressure and asymmetric degree of information at the industry level. Using the proportion of enterprise sewage charges in management expenses and the degree of environmental information disclosure as a measure of environmental pressure and information asymmetry at the enterprise level, the relationship between the variables in the two levels is investigated respectively. Finally. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, an improved government game scheme is put forward according to the existing model, so that the government can make up for the failure of the emission quota system caused by asymmetric information. When the government can only rely on the conscious reporting of enterprises and nominal accounting surveys to estimate the costs of enterprises, enterprises have enough motivation to mislead the government, in order to make the government set more lenient quotas. The proportion of state-owned enterprises in the industry is positively correlated with the relative intensity of environmental regulation in the industry, that is, the government may have collected more accurate information about the strength of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, in a large number of state-owned enterprises in the industry to establish a relatively strict quota. The empirical evidence at the enterprise level, the environmental information disclosure degree of enterprises, its sewage charges in the proportion of management costs is also higher. As a result, the reduction of information asymmetry may make enterprises (or at least listed companies) have to face larger environmental expenditure. Finally, the improved game scheme believes that, without considering the replacement of policy tools. If the government is unable to deal with the information asymmetry, it can adopt a mixed strategy in theory, that is, the government can adopt the soft limit with a certain probability and keep the final regulatory form confidential in advance. Companies don't announce their environmental investments until they pay for them. In this way, the government can achieve lower social cost expectations.
【学位授予单位】：合肥工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F279.2;F224.32;F205

【相似文献】