PMC模式激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-27 22:15

本文选题：PMC模式 + 三级道德风险模型　；参考：《西南交通大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：伴随经济建设的突飞猛进,大型建设项目越来越多,业主由于自身能力水平的不足需要聘请专业的项目管理承包商帮助其对项目进行全局管控,PMC模式便应运而生。在PMC模式下,首先业主委托PMC承包商代其管理项目并与之签订PMC合同；其次PMC承包商直接与施工承包商签订施工合同(获得业主同意并确认)；同时施工承包商又与相应的专业分包商对分包工程签订分包合同。此时,业主,PMC承包商,施工承包商,分包商四者便自上而下形成了三级委托-代理关系,PMC模式的成败很大程度上依赖于PMC承包商,施工承包商和分包商三者的努力水平及合作效率,如何在各级委托-代理关系中实施有效的激励机制显得至关重要。而以往学者并未对PMC模式下存在的完整三级委托-代理链以及考虑分包商存在竞争情况时对各级激励强度的影响机理做出分析。基于此,本论文的主要研究工作包括以下几个方面：1、首先对国内外关于PMC模式与委托-代理理论的相关文献及研究现状进行了综述,结合PMC模式在实际中的运作情况,得出了现有研究的不足,提出本文进一步的研究思路与技术路线,确定了本文的主要研究内容；2、对PMC模式的相关理论进行了综合分析,包括其完整的组织机构、适用范围、优劣势、阶段划分以及其中各参与方存在的道德风险问题；3、根据相关假设,构建不考虑分包商竞争时PMC模式下的三级道德风险简化模型,并对模型进行求解,分析了相邻两级激励强度比值的影响因素及作用机理；4、在第3章模型的基础上,考虑两个同质分包商且他们之间具有竞争关系,构建新的三级道德风险模型,研究了存在分包商竞争与不存在分包商竞争时对相邻两级激励强度比值影响机理的一致性与差异性,并分析了竞争程度对各级委托人最终收益的影响情况。本文从PMC模式下实际存在的三级委托-代理链入手,在不考虑与考虑分包商竞争两种情况下,通过分析相邻两级激励强度比值的影响因素及作用机理,优化激励机制相关设计,具有一定的现实意义。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economic construction, there are more and more large-scale construction projects. The owners need to hire professional project management contractors to help them control the project. Under the PMC mode, the owner first entrusts the PMC contractor to manage the project on its behalf and signs the PMC contract with the contractor. Secondly, the PMC contractor directly signs the construction contract with the construction contractor (obtain the consent of the employer and confirm the contract; at the same time, the construction contractor and the corresponding professional subcontractor sign the subcontract for the subcontract project. At this time, the contractor, the construction contractor and the subcontractor from top to bottom have formed a three-level principal-agent relationship. The success or failure of the model depends largely on the PMC contractor. How to implement the effective incentive mechanism in the principal-agent relationship between the construction contractor and the subcontractor is very important. However, previous scholars have not made an analysis of the complete three-level principal-agent chain under the PMC model and the influence mechanism of incentive intensity at all levels when the subcontractors are considered to be competitive. Based on this, the main research work of this thesis includes the following several aspects: 1. Firstly, this paper summarizes the relevant literature and research status of PMC model and principal-agent theory at home and abroad, and combines the operation of PMC model in practice. The deficiency of the existing research is obtained, the further research train of thought and technical route are put forward, the main research contents of this paper are determined, and the relevant theories of PMC mode are analyzed synthetically, including its complete organization, applicable scope, and so on. The advantages and disadvantages, the division of stages and the moral hazard problems of each participant are discussed. According to the relevant assumptions, the three-level simplified model of moral hazard under the PMC model without considering the competition of subcontractors is constructed, and the model is solved. Based on the model in Chapter 3, a new three-level moral hazard model is constructed by considering the competitive relationship between two homogeneous subcontractors. This paper studies the consistency and difference of the influence mechanism of the incentive intensity ratio of adjacent two levels when there is subcontractor competition and no subcontractor competition, and analyzes the influence of competition degree on the final income of the principal at all levels. This paper starts with the three-level principal-agent chain that actually exists in PMC mode, and optimizes the design of incentive mechanism by analyzing the influencing factors and mechanism of the ratio of incentive intensity to intensity of adjacent two levels without considering and considering the competition of subcontractors. Has certain realistic significance.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F284

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