基于协同效应的混合寡头横向合并福利效应与反垄断控制研究

发布时间：2018-06-02 18:52

本文选题：混合寡头 + 横向合并　；参考：《山东大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：横向合并是现代企业成长与扩张的主要途径之一,由于其潜在的单边效应与协调效应对消费者福利与社会总福利的影响,一直以来是学术界与世界各国反垄断当局关注的重点。自上世纪九十年代起,在不断深化改革、产业结构调整、国有企业改革等诸多因素的影响下,我国兴起了一阵以横向兼并为主的并购浪潮。进入二十一世纪尤其是自十八届三中全会以来,中央政府提出了“要积极发展混合所有制经济,使得所有制资本取长补短、相互促进、共同发展”。由此发展混合所有制经济成为深化经济体制改革的重要内容。可以预见,混合所有制经济未来将成为我国国民经济运行的重要组成部分,而涉及混合所有制企业的横向合并也将成为横向合并研究新的方向之一。正是在这样的大背景下,本文以古诺寡占竞争模型与斯塔克伯格寡占竞争模型为基本理论模型,借鉴国内外混合寡头研究的相关成果,并在横向合并中引入了协同效应这一概念,构建了基于混合寡头博弈的横向合并模型,从动态博弈和静态博弈的两个角度考察了混合寡头横向合并的的福利效应,并在此基础上探讨针对此类合并的反垄断控制。在研究思路上,本文遵循“理论框架—模拟分析—政策建议”的框架展开研究。全文共分为四章,第一章为导论,介绍了本文的选题背景和研究意义、相关的国内外文献综述、本文研究思路和框架以及本文的创新点与不足,其中文献综述部分重点介绍了基于博弈模型的横向合并的相关研究与混合寡头的相关研究,为本文后续的理论模型构建打下一定的理论基础。第二章考察了基于静态博弈模型的混合寡头横向合并,构建了基于古诺寡占竞争模型的混合寡头横向合并的模型,在求解均衡解的基础上研究了市场竞争结构及企业的所有制结构对企业间横向合并福利结果的影响。发现即使存在能够降低企业生产成本的协同效应,合并仍将导致消费者福利的下降,合并引起的社会总福利改变则随混合所有制企业中私有产权比重的上升呈现倒U型特征。第三章则考察了基于动态博弈模型的混合寡头横向合并,构建了基于斯塔克伯格寡占竞争模型的混合寡头横向合并的模型,在求均衡解的基础上同样研究了市场结构及企业产权结构对企业间横向合并福利结果的影响,研究结果仍发现合并会导致消费者福利的下降。在合并引起的社会总福利变化的考察上,“强强联合”的合并情形下存在一定的社会总福利改进空间,“弱弱联合”的改进空间则比较小。第四章在第二、三章研究的基础上探讨了反垄断横向合并的反垄断控制标准,在政策建议中提出反垄断机构应充分考虑产权因素对合并福利结果的影响,并在此基础上形成适用于不同产权类型企业间横向合并相对统一的反垄断控制标准。
[Abstract]:Horizontal merger is one of the main ways for the growth and expansion of modern enterprises. Because of its potential unilateral effect and coordination effect on consumer welfare and total social welfare, it has always been the focus of attention of the academic circles and the antitrust authorities all over the world. Since 1990s, under the influence of many factors, such as deepening the reform, adjusting the industrial structure and reforming the state-owned enterprises, there has been a wave of mergers and acquisitions in China. In the 21 century, especially since the third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the central government put forward that "it is necessary to actively develop the mixed ownership economy so as to make the ownership capital complement each other, promote each other, and develop together". From this development mixed ownership economy becomes the important content that deepens economic system reform. It can be predicted that the future of mixed ownership economy will become an important part of our national economy, and the horizontal merger involving mixed ownership enterprises will become one of the new directions of horizontal merger research. Under this background, this paper takes Cournot oligopoly competition model and Stackberg oligopoly competition model as the basic theoretical model, and draws lessons from the related achievements of mixed oligopoly research at home and abroad. The concept of synergetic effect is introduced into the horizontal merger, and the horizontal merger model based on mixed oligopoly game is constructed, and the welfare effect of crosswise merger of mixed oligarchs is investigated from two aspects of dynamic game and static game. On this basis, this paper discusses the anti-monopoly control for this kind of merger. The research follows the framework of "theoretical framework-simulation analysis-policy recommendations". This paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. It introduces the background and significance of this paper, the related literature review at home and abroad, the research ideas and framework of this paper, as well as the innovative points and shortcomings of this paper. In the part of literature review, the related research of horizontal merger based on game model and the research of mixed oligopoly are introduced, which lays a theoretical foundation for the subsequent theoretical model construction in this paper. In the second chapter, the horizontal merger of mixed oligarchs based on static game model is investigated, and the model of crosswise merger of mixed oligarchs based on Cournot oligopoly competition model is constructed. On the basis of solving the equilibrium solution, the influence of market competition structure and enterprise ownership structure on the results of horizontal merger welfare among enterprises is studied. It is found that even if there is a synergistic effect that can reduce the production cost of the enterprise, the merger will still lead to the decline of consumer welfare, and the change of the total social welfare caused by the merger will show an inverted U-shaped feature with the increase of the proportion of private property rights in the mixed ownership enterprises. In the third chapter, the horizontal merger of mixed oligarchs based on dynamic game model is investigated, and the model of horizontal merger of mixed oligarchs based on Stackberg oligopoly competition model is constructed. On the basis of the equilibrium solution, the paper also studies the influence of market structure and enterprise property right structure on the benefits of horizontal merger between enterprises. The results show that the merger will lead to the decline of consumer welfare. In the study of the changes of the total social welfare caused by the merger, there is a certain space for the improvement of the total social welfare in the case of the merger of "strong and strong", but the improvement of "weak and weak" is relatively small. The fourth chapter discusses the antitrust control standard of antitrust horizontal merger on the basis of the second and third chapters, and puts forward that the antitrust agency should fully consider the influence of the property right factor on the result of the merger welfare in the policy suggestion. On this basis, the anti-monopoly control standard which is applicable to the horizontal merger of different property right enterprises is formed.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F276.8;F224.32

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