城市公用事业公私合作中的收益分配——契约安排与博弈分析

发布时间：2018-07-05 00:09

本文选题：收益分配 + 公私合作制　；参考：《学习与实践》2016年01期

【摘要】：合理的收益分配机制是维系城市公用事业公私合作制的根本所在。通过构建两阶段融资契约模型,采用博弈分析法分析公私合作中收益分配的内在机制,结果表明,无论收益能否事前验证,政府资金约束都是公私合作收益分配的重要因素,并且政府资金约束越大,项目风险越高,最优收益分配机制所决定的私人部门收益分配系数就越高。在收益不可事前验证的情况下,将项目收益完全转移至私人部门,将有助于提升其最优努力水平和项目运营效率。但在制度不完善的情况下,政府对项目利益的侵占不仅降低了私人部门的努力水平,甚至可能打破参与约束条件导致合作终止。因此,政府角色定位将直接影响城市公用事业公私合作制的推进。
[Abstract]:The rational income distribution mechanism is the fundamental to maintain the public-private cooperation system of urban public utilities. By constructing a two-stage financing contract model and using the game analysis method to analyze the internal mechanism of income distribution in public-private cooperation, the results show that, no matter whether the income can be verified in advance, the government capital constraint is an important factor in the distribution of public-private partnership income. Moreover, the greater the constraint of government funds, the higher the project risk, and the higher the private sector income distribution coefficient determined by the optimal income allocation mechanism. Under the condition that the income can not be verified beforehand, the transfer of the project income to the private sector will help to improve the optimal level of effort and the efficiency of the project operation. However, in the case of imperfect system, the government's encroachment on the project interests not only reduces the level of private sector's efforts, but also breaks the constraint of participation and leads to the termination of cooperation. Therefore, the role of the government will directly affect the promotion of public-private cooperation system of urban public utilities.
【作者单位】：山西财经大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“城市公用事业特许经营权竞标机制分类设计与管制政策研究”(71303208) 浙江省教育厅项目“城市公用事业市场化改革效果评价研究”(Y201328821)
【分类号】：F299.24;F224.32

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