多属性逆向拍卖中最优信息披露政策研究
发布时间：2018-12-20 09:42
【摘要】：随着电子商务的快速发展,在线逆向拍卖已成为一种新型电子化采购工具,其不仅可以扩大供应商选择范围,更能大幅度地降低采购成本、提高采购效率,进而为采供双方带来更多的收益。鉴于此,越来越多的公司开始采用该项技术进行全球化采购。拍卖中披露的信息作为影响采供双方行为和收益的重要因素,近年来引起高度关注。本文主要目的在于探讨多属性逆向拍卖中不同拍卖阶段的最优信息披露政策,通过仿真实验验证模型推导结果并补充所得结论,在此基础上探究信息有效披露的管理策略。本文研究按信息披露发生在实时报价前和实时报价后两大阶段进行。在实时报价前的阶段,首先,通过建立博弈模型求出供应商真假披露自身信息与采购商是否核实的均衡,给出不同情形下采供双方的应对策略及为促进诚信交易采供双方的管理建议。其次,运用博弈方法求解并分析披露和不披露供应商质量属性值对应的采购商效用。在实时报价后的阶段,建立基于伯兰德的动态博弈模型,分析首轮投标后完全披露和非完全披露供应商报价对采供双方的影响,并通过MATLAB7.0软件得到图形化界面。而后,开发了一个仿真实验网站用以模拟不同信息披露政策下的拍卖流程,通过收集和分析实验数据,验证和补充模型推导。最后,基于采供双方视角给出信息有效披露的策略建议。结果表明:(1)实时报价前,为促进供应商真实披露减少采购商核实,应提高采购商核实效率,加大处分力度,降核实成本和供应商虚假披露的额外收益等。当各供应商质量属性值分布不均匀时应将该值予以披露,分布均匀时不披露更为有利。(2)实时报价后,一般情形下完全披露供应商首轮信息更优,当一轮获胜者质量属性显著占优或并非最优时选择非完全披露政策。且信息披露政策对不同质量属性级别的供应商效应程度不同,造成供应商反应策略有所差异。(3)为促进诚信交易和信息有效披露,采购商应正确引导,建立奖惩机制,提高自身实力和准入门槛,视具体情况灵活采用相应的信息披露政策。供应商应“说真话”,提高自身质量属性,理性竞争等。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce, online reverse auction has become a new electronic procurement tool, which can not only expand the scope of supplier selection, but also greatly reduce procurement costs and improve procurement efficiency. In turn, for the two parties to the harvest to bring more revenue. In view of this, more and more companies began to use the technology for global procurement. The information disclosed in the auction, as an important factor affecting the behavior and income of both parties, has attracted much attention in recent years. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the optimal information disclosure policy in different auction stages of multi-attribute reverse auction. The results of the model are verified by simulation experiments and the conclusions are supplemented. On this basis, the management strategy of effective disclosure of information is explored. In this paper, information disclosure occurs before and after real-time quotation. In the stage before real-time quotation, first of all, by establishing a game model to find out the balance between the true and false disclosure of the supplier's own information and whether the purchaser verifies or not. The coping strategies of both parties in different situations and the management suggestions of both parties in order to promote the good faith transaction are given. Secondly, using the game method to solve and analyze the buyer utility corresponding to the disclosure and non-disclosure of supplier quality attribute value. The dynamic game model based on Burland is established to analyze the influence of complete and incomplete disclosure of supplier quotation on the two parties after the first round of bidding. The graphical interface is obtained by MATLAB7.0 software. Then, a simulation experiment website is developed to simulate the auction process under different information disclosure policies. Through collecting and analyzing the experimental data, we verify and supplement the model derivation. Finally, based on the perspective of the two parties, the effective disclosure of information is proposed. The results are as follows: (1) in order to promote the true disclosure of suppliers and reduce the verification of buyers, we should improve the efficiency of verification, increase the punishment, reduce the cost of verification and the extra income of false disclosure of suppliers. When the quality attribute value of each supplier is distributed unevenly, the value should be disclosed, and it is more advantageous not to disclose the value when the distribution is even. (2) after the real-time quotation, it is better to completely disclose the first round information of the supplier in general. The incomplete disclosure policy is chosen when the quality attribute of a winner is significantly superior or not optimal. And the effect of information disclosure policy on different quality attributes of suppliers is different, which results in different supplier response strategies. (3) in order to promote good faith transactions and effective disclosure of information, buyers should guide correctly and establish reward and punishment mechanism. Improve their own strength and entry threshold, according to specific circumstances flexible use of the corresponding information disclosure policy. Suppliers should "tell the truth", improve their own quality attributes, rational competition and so on.
【学位授予单位】：江苏科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274;F224.32
本文编号：2387811
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of electronic commerce, online reverse auction has become a new electronic procurement tool, which can not only expand the scope of supplier selection, but also greatly reduce procurement costs and improve procurement efficiency. In turn, for the two parties to the harvest to bring more revenue. In view of this, more and more companies began to use the technology for global procurement. The information disclosed in the auction, as an important factor affecting the behavior and income of both parties, has attracted much attention in recent years. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the optimal information disclosure policy in different auction stages of multi-attribute reverse auction. The results of the model are verified by simulation experiments and the conclusions are supplemented. On this basis, the management strategy of effective disclosure of information is explored. In this paper, information disclosure occurs before and after real-time quotation. In the stage before real-time quotation, first of all, by establishing a game model to find out the balance between the true and false disclosure of the supplier's own information and whether the purchaser verifies or not. The coping strategies of both parties in different situations and the management suggestions of both parties in order to promote the good faith transaction are given. Secondly, using the game method to solve and analyze the buyer utility corresponding to the disclosure and non-disclosure of supplier quality attribute value. The dynamic game model based on Burland is established to analyze the influence of complete and incomplete disclosure of supplier quotation on the two parties after the first round of bidding. The graphical interface is obtained by MATLAB7.0 software. Then, a simulation experiment website is developed to simulate the auction process under different information disclosure policies. Through collecting and analyzing the experimental data, we verify and supplement the model derivation. Finally, based on the perspective of the two parties, the effective disclosure of information is proposed. The results are as follows: (1) in order to promote the true disclosure of suppliers and reduce the verification of buyers, we should improve the efficiency of verification, increase the punishment, reduce the cost of verification and the extra income of false disclosure of suppliers. When the quality attribute value of each supplier is distributed unevenly, the value should be disclosed, and it is more advantageous not to disclose the value when the distribution is even. (2) after the real-time quotation, it is better to completely disclose the first round information of the supplier in general. The incomplete disclosure policy is chosen when the quality attribute of a winner is significantly superior or not optimal. And the effect of information disclosure policy on different quality attributes of suppliers is different, which results in different supplier response strategies. (3) in order to promote good faith transactions and effective disclosure of information, buyers should guide correctly and establish reward and punishment mechanism. Improve their own strength and entry threshold, according to specific circumstances flexible use of the corresponding information disclosure policy. Suppliers should "tell the truth", improve their own quality attributes, rational competition and so on.
【学位授予单位】：江苏科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274;F224.32
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