企业环境信息公开与政府监管策略的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2019-01-16 03:16

【摘要】：由于企业与消费者、投资者、政府等利益相关者之间存在着信息不对称,而真实的企业环境信息是利益相关者做出决策的必要前提,所以具有良好环境行为的企业愿意公开真实的环境信息,但同时也会使不具有良好环境行为的企业有动机公开虚假的环境信息以谋取额外收益,进而导致企业环境信息的信号传递失效。针对此问题,本文考虑了相关主体的有限理性特征,构建了企业是否真实公开环境信息与政府监管行为交互的演化模型,分析了不同参数的变化对系统演化结果的影响,并通过数值实验模拟了不同初始状态和参数设置下的系统演化过程,得出了一定的结论。研究表明:初始状态时的政府监管概率、政府的监管成本、对企业公开虚假环境信息的惩罚、政府选择监管策略的收益、企业真实公开环境信息的收益和企业的伪装效果系数对系统的演化结果具有重要影响,通过政策手段对这些参数进行调控可以引导系统向良好模式演化,使企业公开真实的环境信息,达到环境信息的信号传递作用。
[Abstract]:Because the information asymmetry exists between the enterprise and the consumers, investors, government and other stakeholders, and the real enterprise environment information is the necessary premise for the stakeholders to make the decision. Therefore, enterprises with good environmental behavior are willing to disclose real environmental information, but at the same time, enterprises that do not have good environmental behavior are motivated to disclose false environmental information in order to obtain additional benefits. And then lead to the enterprise environmental information signal transmission failure. In order to solve this problem, this paper takes into account the limited rational characteristics of relevant subjects, constructs an evolutionary model of whether the enterprise truly discloses environmental information and government regulatory behavior, and analyzes the influence of the change of different parameters on the evolution results of the system. The system evolution process under different initial state and parameter setting is simulated by numerical experiments, and a certain conclusion is drawn. The results show that: the probability of government regulation, the cost of government regulation, the punishment of disclosure of false environmental information, the revenue of government choosing regulatory strategy, The profit from the real disclosure of environmental information and the camouflage effect coefficient of the enterprise have an important influence on the evolution result of the system. Through the policy means to regulate these parameters, we can guide the system to a good model evolution. Make the enterprise open the true environment information, achieve the signal transmission function of the environment information.
【作者单位】：江苏大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“名牌产品供应链不良环境行为:形成、演化及治理策略研究”(71471076)
【分类号】：D63;F224.32;F275

【相似文献】