运输问题的合作对策求解方法

发布时间：2019-02-14 14:32

【摘要】：产地间或销地间往往存在竞争,在这种情况下,使用运输问题最优化方法是不合理的。因此,从个体理性的视角提出运输问题的合作对策求解方法,方法将运输问题看作是一个博弈问题,各个产地或销地是博弈的局中人,求解其纳什均衡与纳什讨价还价解。在此基础上,说明了运输问题的非合作形式是一个指派问题,并证明指派问题的最优解是一个纳什均衡点。接着,通过实验验证运输问题的最优解是一个纳什讨价还价解,满足产地或销地的自身利益。在此基础上,针对纳什讨价还价解不唯一的问题,从决策者的视角给出最大可能激励成本的计算方法。最后,为弥补纳什讨价还价解不唯一及纳什讨价还价解不允许出现子联盟的缺陷,给出运输收益分配或成本分摊的Shapely值计算方法。
[Abstract]:There is often competition between producing areas or between markets, in which case it is unreasonable to use the optimization method for transportation problems. Therefore, from the perspective of individual rationality, this paper puts forward a solution method of cooperative game for transportation problem. The method regards the transportation problem as a game problem. Each place of origin or place of sale is the person in the game, and the Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining solution are solved. On this basis, it is proved that the non-cooperative form of the transport problem is an assignment problem, and that the optimal solution of the assignment problem is a Nash equilibrium point. Then, it is proved by experiments that the optimal solution of transportation problem is a Nash bargaining solution, which satisfies the self-interest of the place of origin or sale. On this basis, aiming at the problem that Nash's bargaining solution is not unique, this paper gives a method to calculate the maximum possible incentive cost from the perspective of decision makers. Finally, in order to make up for the deficiency that Nash's bargaining solution is not unique and Nash's bargaining solution is not allowed to appear sub-alliance, the Shapely value calculation method of transportation income distribution or cost sharing is given.
【作者单位】：青岛大学商学院;福州大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家杰出青年科学基金:决策理论与方法(70925004)
【分类号】：F224.32;F252

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