季节性存货质押融资合作模式分析

发布时间：2019-05-18 08:16

【摘要】：中小微企业的大规模增加促使企业间的竞争向供应链间竞争转变,对供应链金融的风险控制水平提出了更高的要求,物流金融的发展和创新为银行等金融机构提供了有效管控风险的方式。本文研究了统一授信模式下供应商、销售商、物流企业三方组成的供应链在季节性存货质押融资中各方的决策行为,首先提出基本假设,在不合作与不同合作模式下构建资金约束下的非合作博弈模型,讨论销售商的再订购决策、物流企业的质押率决策间的博弈行为;然后基于夏普利值方法建立了联盟合作博弈模型,分析联盟合作存在的可能性,求解得出联盟收益分配方式;最后,进行了数值实验,验证结论。研究表明,在供应商作为核心企业市场竞争地位低于物流企业时,在一定情况下,通过合作能降低对销售商规模要求,并提高联盟收益。
[Abstract]:The large-scale increase of small and medium-sized and micro-enterprises promotes the transformation of competition between enterprises to the competition between supply chains, and puts forward higher requirements for the level of risk control of supply chain finance. The development and innovation of logistics finance provides banks and other financial institutions with an effective way to manage risks. This paper studies the decision-making behavior of the supply chain composed of suppliers, sellers and logistics enterprises in seasonal inventory pledge financing under the unified credit model, and first puts forward the basic assumptions. Under the condition of non-cooperation and different cooperation modes, the non-cooperative game model under the constraint of funds is constructed, and the game behavior between the rescheduling decision of the seller and the pledge rate decision of the logistics enterprise is discussed. Then, based on the Sharpley value method, the alliance cooperative game model is established, the possibility of alliance cooperation is analyzed, and the income distribution mode of alliance is obtained. Finally, numerical experiments are carried out to verify the conclusion. The research shows that when the competitive position of suppliers as the core enterprises is lower than that of logistics enterprises, under certain circumstances, cooperation can reduce the requirements for the scale of sellers and improve the income of the alliance.
【作者单位】：南京理工大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471089) 江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(13GLC013) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(30920140132002)
【分类号】：F224;F275

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