我国基础设施特许经营合约的非完备性研究

发布时间：2019-05-24 12:46

【摘要】：在过去三十年中,我国基础设施特许经营的发展经历了多重起伏。但因其在融资和改善管理等方面有着其他经营方式无法替代的作用,而逐渐被人们接受。从2013年开始,在中央政府的支持及各级地方政府的大力推广下,基础设施特许经营在我国呈现出了不可阻挡的发展势头。我们不能把基础设施特许经营当成解决政府融资难的万能药,而应以更加谨慎的态度对待,使其发挥出应有的效果。为确保特许项目的成功运作,应提前把握项目运行过程中的关键问题,如特许合约的非完备性问题。基础设施特许经营的核心是特许合约。由于预见成本、缔约成本和证实成本等因素,使得特许合约具有非完备性。特许合约的非完备性作为一个不可避免的问题伴随着基础设施特许经营项目运行的全过程,给项目的顺利运行增大了难度。本文以不完全合约理论为基础,结合基础设施的特点,重点分析了特许合约的性质、合约非完备性的表现形式、产生原因及治理路径。并在最后对现实案例进行了分析,力求对基础设施特许经营合约的非完备性做一个全面、深入的研究,为实践提供理论依据。本文分为六章,第一章介绍了基础设施特许经营的研究背景及意义、相关概念界定、研究内容与方法及国内外相关文献研究综述。第二章分为两部分。第一部分,从特许人与被特许人之间的地位关系、标的物的特殊性及特许项目的目标三方面的分析出发,认为基础设施特许合约更加符合行政合约的特点,应属于行政合约而非民事合约的范畴。第二部分,分析了特许合约非完备性的表现形式有如下三类:合约内容不完善、第三方验证困难及无法预期的事件。第三方验证困难包括不可观察的信息和可观察却不可验证的信息。无法预期的事件则包括自然环境变化、政治制度和法律变化、经济和科技冲击等。作为一纸协议,特许合约根本无法囊括特许经营项目的所有活动内容。第三章从共性和中国特性两方面分别阐述了基础设施特许经营合约非完备性产生的原因。一般原因有信息不对称和有限理性、政企地位不对等、基础设施项目的特殊性及合约期限的长期性等。由于各国国情不同,我国特许经营合约非完备性产生的原因与一般原因有所不同,有着自己的特点。具体分析我国的原因有特许经营模式的发展不成熟、政府承诺失信、监管体制不完善、法律体系不健全等。第四章从三个方面讨论了特许合约非完备性的治理路径:合理设计合约、约束监管部门的行为、优化法治环境。第一,合理设计合约。本文认为设计一个合理的合约最主要的是制定合理的激励机制和收益分配原则。第二,约束监管部门的行为。合约的签订和执行都属于政府的监管范围,没有政府的诚信监管,内容再完备的合约最终也将归于不完备。通过建立一个不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析得出监管部门和私营企业的行为选择并非出于偶尔,而是双方经过N期重复博弈后各自追求利益最大化的结果。第三,优化法治环境。法治环境包括监管机构及相关的法律体系。作为基础设施特许经营发展的外部条件,法治环境是导致特许合约具有非完备性的原因之一,同时也是特许合约非完备性的有效治理路径之一。第五章结合现实案例进行分析和总结,证实了特许合约若未得到妥善处理,将导致整个项目的失败;若能得到妥善处理,则最终会促进多方共赢的实现。第六章对全文进行了总结,并阐述了有待进一步研究的问题。
[Abstract]:Over the past three decades, the development of our country's infrastructure concession has experienced multiple ups and downs. However, it has been accepted as a result of its irreplaceable role in financing and improving management. Starting in 2013, with the support of the central government and the great extension of local governments at all levels, the infrastructure concession operation has shown an unstoppable development momentum in our country. We cannot make the concession operation of the infrastructure as a panacea for solving the financing difficulties of the government, and should be treated with a more cautious attitude so as to play the due effect. In order to ensure the successful operation of the concession project, the key problems in the project operation should be grasped in advance, such as the non-completeness of the concession contract. The core of the infrastructure concession operation is the concession contract. As a result of the foreseeable costs, the costs of contracting and the cost of substantiation, the concession contract has a non-completeness. As an inevitable problem, the non-completeness of the concession contract is accompanied by the whole process of the operation of the infrastructure concession operation project, which increases the difficulty for the smooth operation of the project. Based on the theory of incomplete contract and the characteristics of infrastructure, this paper analyzes the nature of the contract, the form of non-completeness of the contract, the cause and the management path. In the end, the paper analyzes the real case, and tries to provide a comprehensive and in-depth study on the non-completeness of the contract of the infrastructure concession, and provide the theoretical basis for the practice. This paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the research background and significance of the infrastructure concession operation, the definition of the relevant concepts, the content and methods of the research and the review of the relevant literature at home and abroad. The second chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, from the analysis of the status relationship between the franchisee and the franchisee, the particularity of the subject matter and the objective of the franchise project, it is considered that the infrastructure concession contract is more in line with the characteristics of the administrative contract, and it should be the category of the administrative contract rather than the civil contract. The second part analyzes the non-completeness of the concession contract in three categories: the contract content is not perfect, the third-party verification is difficult and the unexpected event can not be expected. Third-party validation difficulties include non-observable information and observable and non-verifiable information. Unpredictable events include natural environment changes, political systems and legal changes, economic and scientific shocks, and the like. As a paper agreement, the concession contract cannot cover all the activities of the franchise. In the third chapter, the reasons of the non-completeness of the infrastructure concession contract are set forth from the aspects of the general character and the Chinese character. The general causes are information asymmetry and limited reason, the non-equivalence of the status of the government and the enterprise, the particularity of the infrastructure project and the long-term nature of the contract term. Due to the different national conditions, the reason of the non-complete nature of the franchise contract in our country is different from the general reason, and has its own characteristics. The analysis of the reason of our country is that the development of the franchise model is not mature, the government promises to lose the letter, the supervision system is not perfect, the legal system is not perfect, etc. The fourth chapter discusses the governing path of the non-completeness of the concession contract from three aspects: the reasonable design of the contract, the restriction of the behavior of the supervision department and the optimization of the rule of law environment. First, a reasonable design contract. In this paper, it is considered that the most important of the design of a reasonable contract is to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism and the principle of income distribution. Second, the behavior of the regulatory authorities is restricted. The signing and execution of the contract are within the scope of the government's supervision, without the integrity supervision of the government, and the complete contract will eventually be incomplete. Through the establishment of an incomplete information dynamic game model, it is concluded that the behavior choice of the regulatory and private enterprises is not for the occasional, but the result of the mutual interest maximization after the two parties through the N-phase repeated game. Third, optimize the rule of law environment. The rule of law environment includes the regulatory body and the related legal system. As an external condition of the development of the concession operation of the infrastructure, the rule of law environment is one of the reasons leading to the non-completeness of the concession contract, and is also one of the effective management paths for the non-completeness of the concession contract. The fifth chapter analyzes and summarizes the practical cases, and proves that if the concession contract is not properly handled, it will lead to the failure of the whole project; if it is properly handled, the multi-party win-win will be promoted. The sixth chapter summarizes the full text, and expounds the problems to be further studied.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F281

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