PPP模式中的“围观”困局及其破解思路
发布时间：2019-07-30 18:33
【摘要】：随着我国经济发展进入新常态,PPP模式在公共服务有效供给中的作用日益凸显。从目前关于PPP的研究焦点来看,基本集中在对PPP概念、风险与利益配置的相关研究上,而针对目前在国内推广PPP模式中出现的民营资本"围观"现象关注相对较少。本文从行为主体利益差异的视角对这一现象进行了分析,进而为构建基于多方共赢的PPP合作机制做一些有益的探索。本文认为,在明确政府与社会资本利益边界的基础上,从激励兼容的视角设置严格的市场准入机制,合理的风险分担与投资回报机制,完善的监管机制以及有效的综合协调与争端解决机制,是破解"围观"困境的关键。
[Abstract]:With the economic development of our country entering the new normal, the role of PPP model in the effective supply of public services is becoming more and more prominent. From the current research focus on PPP, it basically focuses on the concept of PPP, risk and interest allocation, but relatively little attention has been paid to the phenomenon of "onlooker" of private capital in the promotion of PPP model in China. This paper analyzes this phenomenon from the perspective of the difference of interests of actors, and then makes some useful explorations for the construction of PPP cooperation mechanism based on multi-party and win-win. This paper holds that on the basis of defining the boundary between government and social capital interests, setting up strict market access mechanism, reasonable risk sharing and investment return mechanism, perfect supervision mechanism and effective comprehensive coordination and dispute settlement mechanism from the perspective of incentive compatibility is the key to solve the dilemma of "onlooker".
【作者单位】： 西北师范大学经济学院;
【分类号】：F283
，
本文编号：2521071
[Abstract]:With the economic development of our country entering the new normal, the role of PPP model in the effective supply of public services is becoming more and more prominent. From the current research focus on PPP, it basically focuses on the concept of PPP, risk and interest allocation, but relatively little attention has been paid to the phenomenon of "onlooker" of private capital in the promotion of PPP model in China. This paper analyzes this phenomenon from the perspective of the difference of interests of actors, and then makes some useful explorations for the construction of PPP cooperation mechanism based on multi-party and win-win. This paper holds that on the basis of defining the boundary between government and social capital interests, setting up strict market access mechanism, reasonable risk sharing and investment return mechanism, perfect supervision mechanism and effective comprehensive coordination and dispute settlement mechanism from the perspective of incentive compatibility is the key to solve the dilemma of "onlooker".
【作者单位】： 西北师范大学经济学院;
【分类号】：F283
，
本文编号：2521071
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