工程项目经理激励约束博弈模型与机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-11 07:16

本文关键词：工程项目经理激励约束博弈模型与机制研究　出处：《华北电力大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国建筑行业的高速发展和市场经济体制的改革,当前的建筑市场竞争变得更加激烈,如何在激烈的市场中求得发展就成为了当前建筑企业在经营过程中亟待解决的问题。对工程施工进行全过程的项目管理必须有一个责任主体——项目经理。一个新的工程项目从开工建设到竣工决算,怎样才能为施工企业节省资金、降低损耗、节省劳动力、保证项目质量目标及进度目标的如期实现,从而为施工企业取得最大的经济效益,这就取决于施工企业是否有一套良好的管理机制,也取决于项目经理是否把施工企业的效益最大化作为自己的行为目标从而实现商品经济条件下自身责、权、利的相互协调和统一。本文从经济学的角度,对施工建筑企业项目经理的激励约束机制的现状进行分析,揭示其中存在的不足。在委托——代理理论的基础上,着重工程项目的成本控制方面,分析建筑企业项目经理的行为策略组合与企业监督的博弈过程,通过建立项目经理的激励模型、监督模型、项目经理的效用模型及企业效用模型的基础模型,在参与约束和激励相容约束的约束条件下,构建出项目经理激励约束博弈模型,并提出对项目经理薪酬激励的办法,通过监督或激励来缓解项目经理的投机行为。本文通过所建模型将项目经理三种报酬形式的效果比较分析后,得出包干制最优的结论,并为如何有效地避免项目经理的投机行为、改进当前激励监督机制提出了建议。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the construction industry and the reform of the market economic system in China, the current construction market competition has become more fierce. How to develop in the fierce market has become an urgent problem in the management process of current construction enterprises. The project management in the whole process of construction construction must have a main body of responsibility-the project manager. The new project accounts from the start of construction to the completion of the final account. How to save money, reduce wastage, save labor force, ensure the project quality goal and progress target achieved on schedule for construction enterprises, so as to obtain the greatest economic benefits for construction enterprises. This depends on whether the construction enterprise has a set of good management mechanism, but also depends on whether the project manager takes the maximum benefit of the construction enterprise as its own behavior goal to realize its own responsibility and right under the condition of commodity economy. From the perspective of economics, this paper analyzes the current situation of the incentive and constraint mechanism of project managers in construction enterprises, and reveals the shortcomings of the mechanism, based on the principal-agent theory. Focusing on the cost control of the project, the paper analyzes the game process between the behavior strategy combination of the project manager and the enterprise supervision, and establishes the incentive model and supervision model of the project manager. The utility model of project manager and the basic model of enterprise utility model, under the constraints of participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints, the game model of incentive constraints of project managers is constructed. And put forward to the project manager compensation incentive method, through supervision or incentive to alleviate the project manager's speculative behavior. The paper draws the conclusion that the system is optimal and puts forward some suggestions on how to effectively avoid the speculative behavior of the project manager and improve the current incentive and supervision mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F272.92;F426.92;TU71

【相似文献】