终极控制人代理、两权分离模式与控制权私利

发布时间：2018-01-01 20:37

本文关键词：终极控制人代理、两权分离模式与控制权私利　出处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文在终极控制人代理框架下,研究了三种不同控制机制的控制权私利水平与行为特征.结果表明:1)控制人私利水平与两权分离度正相关,与控股股东现金流权负相关,与股东权利法律保护程度负相关;2)双重股权结构下,终极控制人控制权私利水平随着优先股投票权倍数的增大以边际递减的速度增加,通常选择10倍投票权的优先股设置模式;金字塔股权结构下,终极控制人控制权私利水平随金字塔层级增加以边际递减的速度增大,通常选择3层左右的控制链层级模式;交叉持股结构下,终极控制人控制权私利水平随集团内控制的公司数量增加而增大,倾向于创建庞大的"企业帝国";3)数值模拟显示,我国上市公司终极控制人控制权私利水平在6%~8%之间.
[Abstract]:In this paper, under the framework of ultimate controller agent, we study the level and behavior characteristics of control interests of three different control mechanisms. The results show that the level of control personal interests is positively related to the separation of two rights. Negative correlation with cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, and negative correlation with the degree of legal protection of shareholders' rights; 2) under the dual ownership structure, the level of self-interest of the ultimate controller's control rights increases with the increase of the voting multiple of preferred stock at the rate of marginal decline, and the preferred stock with 10 times voting rights is usually chosen as the mode of setting up; Under the structure of pyramid ownership, the level of self-interest of the ultimate controller increases with the increase of pyramid hierarchy, and usually the three-layer control chain hierarchy mode is chosen. Under the cross-shareholding structure, the level of the ultimate controlling right of private interests increases with the increase of the number of companies controlled within the group, and tends to create a huge "enterprise empire"; 3) the numerical simulation shows that the level of the ultimate controlling right of the listed company is between 6% and 8%.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;兰州商学院统计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71232004,71172082,71372137) 国家留学基金(201206050094)
【分类号】：F271;F224
【正文快照】： o引言随着委托代理关系研究的深入,在大股东代理问题研究基础上,沿着产权控制路径追溯而发现的终极控股股东代理问题的研究越来越受到关注.自1999年以来,La Porta等!1]、Claessensl2!.Faccio等[3】等学者发现,世界上很多国家的上市公司并不是由公司第一大股东控制,而是受终极

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