合同能源管理（EPC）模式下两制造商的竞争与合作研究

发布时间：2018-01-12 01:35

本文关键词：合同能源管理（EPC）模式下两制造商的竞争与合作研究　出处：《华南理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着经济的快速发展,人们对生活环境的要求越来越高,环境污染与资源短缺等问题却目益严重。人们环保意识的提高以及环境压力的增加迫使节能减排以及环境保护成为企业的社会责任。然而,企业毕竟是追逐利润的主体,通常不会自发地关注环境问题。因此,一些基于市场机制的调控措施(如碳排放权交易制度、合同能源管理等)受到各国的青睐。依靠健全的运行和监督机制,这些措施在发达国家都运行良好,也达到了设计这些制度时的预期效果。我国于2000年发布了《关于进一步推广“合同能源管理机制”的通告》,正式开始启动合同能源管理。经过十多年的实践,我国的合同能源管理发展依然相对落后。究其原因,是我国政府对合同能源管理的扶持力度不足,主要体现为相关法律法规的缺失、政府机关没有带头实施合同能源管理项目、以及激励性的财政措施不足。近年来,我国政府逐渐意识到这一点,并陆续出台税收减免和补贴等措施大力鼓励合同能源管理的发展。受此激励,在我国的合同能源管理实践中出现了中国特有的模式高能耗制造企业之间实施合同能源管理项目,例如：宝钢和攀钢。与用于建筑节能的合同能源管理项目不同,这一类项目的节能服务提供方同时也是客户的竞争对手。正是基于此,本文通过建立了一个两阶段的博弈模型来研究这一中国特有的合同能源管理实践。我们分析了两个制造企业在合同能源管理项目中的竞争与合作,并给出了合同能源管理项目的绩效(企业利润、消费者剩余、环境绩效等)。我们的结果表明：合同能源管理项目的实施将降低节能服务提供企业的产量,提高客户企业的产量；两企业通过实施合同能源管理项目总是能够实现经济利益上的“双赢”；合同能源管理项目的实施提高了总产量以及降低了产品价格,最终导致消费者剩余增加；合同能源管理并不总是能够降低总能耗；合同能源管理项目的环境绩效关于节能服务成本并不是单调的(在某些情况是递减/递增),因此政府实施有关扶持(甚至是遏制)政策时应当是有选择性的。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, people have higher and higher demands on the living environment. The problems of environmental pollution and shortage of resources are becoming more and more serious. However, the improvement of environmental awareness and the increase of environmental pressure force energy conservation and environmental protection to become the social responsibility of enterprises. Firms, after all, are profit-hungry, and usually do not pay spontaneous attention to environmental issues. Therefore, some regulatory measures based on market mechanisms (such as carbon emissions trading system). These measures work well in developed countries and achieve the desired results when designing these systems. In 2000, our country issued the notice about further popularizing "contract energy management mechanism", which officially started to start contract energy management. After more than ten years of practice. The development of contract energy management in our country is still relatively backward. The reason is that our government has insufficient support for contract energy management, which is mainly reflected in the lack of relevant laws and regulations. Government agencies have not taken the lead in implementing contracted energy management projects and inadequate incentive fiscal measures. In recent years, our government is gradually aware of this, and gradually introduced tax relief and subsidies and other measures to encourage the development of contract energy management. In the practice of contract energy management in China, there is a unique mode in China. Implementation of contract energy management projects between high-energy manufacturers, such as Baosteel and Panzhihua Iron and Steel Co., unlike contract energy management projects for energy conservation in buildings. It is based on the fact that the provider of energy-saving services for such projects is also a competitor to the customer. In this paper, a two-stage game model is established to study this unique contract energy management practice in China. We analyze the competition and cooperation of two manufacturing enterprises in the contract energy management project. The performance of the contract energy management project (corporate profit, consumer surplus, environmental performance, etc.) is also given. Our results show that the implementation of the contract energy management project will reduce the output of energy-saving service providers and increase the output of customer enterprises; Through the implementation of contract energy management projects, the two enterprises can always achieve "win-win" in economic interests; The implementation of the contract energy management project increases the total output and reduces the product price, which ultimately leads to the increase of consumer surplus. Contract energy management does not always reduce total energy consumption; The environmental performance of a contract energy management project is not monotonous (in some cases decreasing / increasing) with respect to the cost of energy-efficient services, so the government should be selective in implementing support (or even containment) policies.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F206

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