基于讨价还价博弈的企业经理激励研究

发布时间：2018-01-13 21:29

本文关键词：基于讨价还价博弈的企业经理激励研究　出处：《华北电力大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着生产社会化的不断发展和市场竞争的日益激烈，企业的规模越来越大，所有权和经营权相分离，企业的控制权实际由企业的经理人掌控，企业的经营管理离不开对经理人的激励与约束。由于委托人与代理人各自追求自身利益的最大化，，且他们之间存在着信息不对称、契约不完备等不确定性因素，委托人只有对代理人进行有效的激励和引导，才能使其充分发挥自身的能力，达到企业业绩最优。因此，企业的内部激励尤为重要。然而，过去相当长的时期内，对企业激励理论的研究主要着眼于奖惩制度的建立，或者虽然有与企业激励机制有关的理论研究和实际应用，却很少有考虑经理人讨价还价能力的激励研究，这造成我国企业不能建立完善的激励机制，对企业经理人缺乏充分的激励。本文将创新性的在委托—代理激励模型中引入经理的讨价还价能力这一假设，对我国企业建立合理的激励机制和经理的有效激励问题进行深入的研究，为企业的激励机制设计提供参考。企业的激励机制实际上就是有效解决企业委托—代理关系中企业经理人的道德风险和逆向选择问题，充分调动经理人的积极性，促使经理人努力工作的制度性安排。本文建立了一个动态的经理激励机制设计模型，假设经理在完成第一期任务后，可以与委托人重新谈判，即在委托—代理模型中引入委托人和经理人的讨价还价博弈，研究了经理人的讨价还价能力和企业最优激励水平之间的关系及委托人对经理的有效激励问题。根据计算和分析发现，经理能否得到满意的固定薪酬对经理人的行为选择和企业的长期业绩有重要的影响，委托人为了激励经理努力提高企业业绩，最好的办法不是保证经理人要求的固定报酬，而是增加其分享企业业绩的比例。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of socialized production and the increasingly fierce market competition, increasing the size of the business, the separation of ownership and management rights, control of the actual control by the managers of enterprises, the management of the enterprise cannot do without the incentive and constraint on managers. Because the maximum principal and agent in their pursuit of their own interests between them, and the existence of asymmetric information, incomplete contract and other uncertainties, the client only effective incentive and guidance to the agent, so that it can give full play to its own capabilities, to achieve optimal business performance. Therefore, the internal motivation of enterprises is particularly important. However, for a long period of time, the establishment of research the enterprise incentive theory mainly focuses on the system of rewards and penalties, or although there is incentive mechanism related to theoretical research and practical application and enterprise, but few consider managers. Study on Incentive bargaining ability, which can cause our country to establish the perfect incentive mechanism, the lack of adequate incentives for enterprise managers. In this paper, the hypothesis that the introduction of innovative manager in the principal-agent incentive model of bargaining power, in-depth research on effective incentive problem to establish the reasonable incentive mechanism and the manager told me in the company, to provide the reference for the design of incentive mechanism of the enterprise.
The incentive mechanism of enterprises is actually a valid solution to the enterprise principle of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in enterprise agent manager, fully mobilize the enthusiasm of managers, institutional arrangements encourage managers to work hard. This paper establishes the manager incentive mechanism design of a dynamic model, the assumption that the manager in the completion of the first phase of the task can be. The principal and the re negotiations, namely the introduction of bargaining game client and managers in principal-agent model, the manager's incentive problems of managers' bargaining ability of enterprises and the optimal incentive level between and principal. According to the calculation and analysis, have important influence on the manager can get the long-term performance of the fixed salary satisfaction on the choice of managerial behavior and corporate clients, in order to motivate managers to improve enterprise performance, the best way Instead of ensuring the fixed remuneration required by the manager, it is an increase in the proportion of its share of corporate performance.

【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F224.32

【相似文献】