信息不对称环境下闭环供应链奖惩机制模型研究

发布时间：2018-01-31 16:06

本文关键词： 闭环供应链委托代理理论信息不对称奖惩机制　出处：《中国矿业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着社会经济的发展，人们对电子产品的需求呈现出多样性，推动了科技的创新，同时也加快了电子产品的淘汰速度。这些废弃的电子产品如果处理不当则会对环境造成巨大的威胁，反之，合理的利用则可以缓解资源短缺和环境污染的问题。企业积极参与废弃电子产品的回收再利用不仅可以降低自身成本，同时树立了良好的环保形象，增强了市场竞争力。因此，本文以废旧电子产品回收再利用为载体对闭环供应链进行研究具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文从信息不对称的角度对闭环供应链进行研究，构建了制造商主导，委托零售商或第三方回收商负责回收的闭环供应链回收模式：委托零售商回收、委托第三方回收商回收、委托零售商和第三方回收商竞争回收。回收方拥有自身回收努力程度信息，处于信息优势，而制造商不知道该信息处于信息劣势。根据委托代理理论利用信息甄别的方式，制造商分别对零售商设计了由批发价、回购价和特许经营费构成的甄别契约，对第三方回收商则设计了由回购价和特许经营费构成的甄别契约。通过回收方对甄别契约的选择达到信息甄别的目的。在每种回收模式下分别考虑了无政府奖惩机制及政府对制造商实施奖惩机制的情形。政府设定奖惩力度和目标回收量，如果回收方的回收量超过目标回收量将受到奖励，反之受到惩罚。根据三种回收模式分别建立模型，设定相关参数进行数值仿真，并对主要参数进行敏感性分析。对计算结果进行分析比较后得出如下结论：(1)在竞争回收时，随着竞争的加剧，高回收努力程度的零售商和第三方回收商的回收量及期望利润减少，并且比无竞争时的低；(2)在实施奖惩机制时，，随着奖惩力度的加大，高回收努力程度的零售商和第三方回收商的回收量及期望利润增加，并且比无奖惩机制情形下的高；(3)零售商或第三方回收商分别单独回收时，零售价低的回收模式可以获得较多的回收量。竞争使得回收方的期望利润降低，会影响回收方回收废旧电器电子产品的积极性，而奖惩机制的实施弥补了竞争带来的损失，并为代理回收方带来了利润。因此，对闭环供应链中的制造商实施奖惩机制可以有效的引导回收。
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, people's demand for electronic products presents diversity, which promotes the innovation of science and technology. At the same time, it also speeds up the elimination of electronic products. If these discarded electronic products are not handled properly, they will pose a great threat to the environment, and vice versa. Reasonable utilization can alleviate the problem of resource shortage and environmental pollution. Enterprises actively participate in recycling and reuse of discarded electronic products can not only reduce their own costs, but also set up a good image of environmental protection. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the closed-loop supply chain with the recycling and reuse of used electronic products as the carrier. This paper studies the closed-loop supply chain from the angle of information asymmetry, and constructs a closed-loop supply chain recovery mode: entrusted retailer recycling, which is dominated by manufacturers and responsible for recycling by entrusted retailers or third-party recyclers. Third party recyclers are entrusted with recycling, and retailers and third-party recyclers compete for recovery. The recyclers have information about their own recycling efforts and are in the advantage of information. The manufacturer does not know that the information is in an information disadvantage. According to the principal-agent theory, the manufacturer designs a screening contract for the retailer which consists of wholesale price, repo price and franchise fee. A screening contract consisting of repo price and franchise fee is designed for the third party recycler. The purpose of information screening is achieved through the selection of the screening contract by the recycler. In each recovery mode, anarchic rewards and penalties are considered separately. The mechanism and the situation that the government implements the reward and punishment mechanism to the manufacturer. The government sets the reward and punishment strength and the target recovery amount. If the payback of the recycler exceeds the target payback amount will be rewarded and otherwise punished. According to the three recovery models respectively set up the relevant parameters for numerical simulation. The sensitivity of the main parameters was analyzed. After analyzing and comparing the calculation results, we draw the following conclusion: 1) in the competitive recovery process, with the intensification of competition, the amount of recovery and expected profits of retailers and third-party recyclers with high recycling effort level are reduced. And lower than those without competition; (2) with the increase of reward and punishment, the amount of recovery and expected profit of retailers and third-party recyclers with high level of recycling effort increases, and it is higher than that without reward and punishment mechanism; (3) when retailers or third-party recyclers separately recycle, the recovery mode with low retail price can get more recovery. Competition reduces the expected profit of the recycler. Will affect the recycling of waste electrical and electronic products enthusiasm, and the implementation of reward and punishment mechanism to make up for the loss of competition, and for the agent recycling party to bring profit. The reward and punishment mechanism for the manufacturers in the closed-loop supply chain can effectively guide the recovery.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F252

【参考文献】