企业环境污染治理中的三方博弈

发布时间：2018-02-20 02:17

本文关键词： 企业环境污染治理企业环境行为政府环境NGO 企业纳什均衡　出处：《生态经济》2015年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：企业环境污染问题严重制约着我国经济和社会的发展。企业是否顺从环境规制不仅受到来自政府的压力,还受环境NGO监管,是否顺从规制的决策是政府、环境NGO和企业三方博弈的结果。文章通过构建三方博弈模型,对三方在企业环境污染治理中的利益关系进行均衡分析。结果表明:政府罚金对企业的规制效果优于政府补贴,且高罚金和高补贴并存的制度会降低企业顺从规制的积极性;环境NGO的监督力度对政府检查概率有影响,但并不直接影响企业的顺从概率。因此,制定合理的惩罚与奖励机制、大力支持环境NGO的发展、激励企业技术创新,才能有效规制企业环境行为,实现可持续发展目标。
[Abstract]:The problem of enterprise environmental pollution seriously restricts the economic and social development of our country. Whether enterprises comply with environmental regulation is not only under pressure from the government, but also regulated by environmental NGO. The result of environmental NGO and enterprise tripartite game. This paper constructs a tripartite game model to analyze the benefit relationship of three parties in environmental pollution control. The result shows that the regulation effect of government fine on enterprise is better than that of government subsidy. And the system of high penalty and high subsidy will reduce the enthusiasm of enterprise compliance regulation, the supervision of environmental NGO has influence on the probability of government inspection, but it does not directly affect the probability of compliance of enterprise. Therefore, establish a reasonable punishment and reward mechanism. Only by supporting the development of environmental NGO and encouraging the technological innovation of enterprises can the environmental behavior of enterprises be regulated effectively and the goal of sustainable development be realized.
【作者单位】：江苏大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171099,71001028,71201071,71373103) 教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20123227110011) 江苏省高校“青蓝工程”资助项目江苏省“333工程”资助项目
【分类号】：X322;F224.32

【相似文献】