基于前景理论的代建制寻租博弈分析

发布时间：2018-04-09 09:42

本文选题：前景理论　切入点：博弈论　出处：《西南交通大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：对于代建制寻租问题的研究,大多是从完全理性角度出发,并没有考虑到“人的完全理性假设”的局限性和现实性。目前国内对前景理论的研究和应用主要集中在数据分析、风险决策等问题,与博弈理论相结合的研究比较少,将其运用在代建制寻租研究领域的研究尚属空白。因此,本文在代建制寻租问题研究中,引入前景理论,并运用博弈理论,建立博弈模型分析代建制模式下的寻租行为,充分考虑到人的有限理性和风险不确定状态下人的非理性行为,为代建制模式下的寻租防范提供借鉴与依据。1.将前景理论和静态博弈理论相结合,对博弈收益函数中不确定的收益元素考虑前景理论的影响,构建基于前景理论的代建制寻租静态博弈模型。根据前景理论的价值函数和权重函数建立静态博弈的收益感知矩阵,构建政府、主管部门、代建单位为决策者的三方博弈模型,并对该模型进行求解分析,讨论了针对该模型的代建制寻租防范对策。2.对静态博弈模型进行修正拓展,对各博弈方的整体收益考虑前景理论的影响,构建基于前景理论的代建制寻租静态博弈拓展模型。根据前景理论的价值函数和权重函数建立静态博弈的收益感知矩阵,构建政府、主管部门、代建单位为决策者的三方博弈模型,对该模型进行求解,并和前文的静态博弈模型结果进行了对比分析。3.将前景理论和演化博弈理论相结合,不仅对博弈收益中不确定收益元素考虑了前景理论的影响,引入心理效用的价值函数和权重函数,建立了感知价值收益矩阵。同时,在博弈决策过程中考虑人的有限理论局限,利用演化博弈进行了博弈模型讨论分析,使整个博弈中从博弈收益和决策过程贯穿有限理性思想,构建基于前景理论的代建制寻租演化博弈模型。根据前景理论的价值函数和权重函数建立演化博弈的收益感知矩阵,构建主管部门人员、代建单位人员为决策者的两方博弈模型,并对该模型进行求解,最后对博弈模型结果进行了分析讨论。4.根据前文的研究结果,结合目前我国代建制的发展和监管的现状,讨论代建制模型下对寻租行为的防范对策。
[Abstract]:Most of the researches on rent-seeking by agent system are from the perspective of complete rationality, without considering the limitation and reality of "the assumption of complete rationality of human beings".At present, the research and application of foreground theory mainly focus on data analysis, risk decision and so on, but the research on the combination of game theory and game theory is relatively few, and the research of applying it to the field of rent-seeking by agent system is still blank.Therefore, in the study of rent-seeking in the agent system, the prospect theory is introduced, and the game model is established to analyze the rent-seeking behavior under the agent system model.Taking into account the limited rationality of people and the irrational behavior of people under the uncertain state of risk, this paper provides a reference and basis for rent-seeking prevention in the mode of agent system.The prospect theory is combined with the static game theory to consider the influence of the foreground theory on the uncertain income elements in the income function of the game, and the model of rent-seeking static game based on the prospect theory is constructed.According to the value function and weight function of foreground theory, the income perception matrix of static game is established, and the three-way game model of government, competent department and agent is constructed, and the model is solved and analyzed.This paper discusses the countermeasures of rent-seeking based on agent system. 2. 2.The static game model is modified and extended to consider the influence of the foreground theory on the whole income of the game parties, and a static game expansion model based on the prospect theory is constructed.According to the value function and weight function of the foreground theory, the income perception matrix of the static game is established, and the three-way game model of the government, the competent department and the agent is constructed, and the model is solved.And compared with the static game model. 3. 3.By combining the foreground theory with the evolutionary game theory, this paper not only considers the influence of the prospect theory on the uncertain income elements in the game returns, but also introduces the psychological utility value function and the weight function, and establishes the perceived value return matrix.At the same time, considering the limitation of human's finite theory in the decision-making process of the game, the game model is discussed and analyzed by using the evolutionary game, which makes the whole game run through the idea of bounded rationality from the game profit and the decision-making process.The evolutionary game model of rent-seeking based on foreground theory is constructed.Finally, the game model results are analyzed and discussed.According to the previous research results, combined with the development of agent system and the current situation of supervision in our country, this paper discusses the preventive measures of rent-seeking behavior under the agent system model.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F283;F224.32

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