机动车辆保险代理人与保险人之间的欺诈博弈研究

发布时间：2018-04-09 17:53

本文选题：机动车辆保险　切入点：代理人与保险人　出处：《广西大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：自20世纪80代中国保险业复业以来,保险行业得到了快速而有效的发展,据权威机构统计保费收入以每年30%的速度增长,机动车辆保险作为保险的重要组成部分,其占保险市场的比例越来越大,到2013年底机动车辆保险占财险总额的比例达到70%以上。然而伴随着机动车辆保险市场和经济的发展,很多严峻的问题也随之出现,根据保监会的一些数据显示,机动车辆保险市场存在着严重的保险欺诈现象,我国的保险欺诈金额占保险赔付总额的比例超过20%。这种欺诈行为不仅影响保险公司的利益,同样也影响投保人和受益人的利益。如今的保险市场由于保险代理人和保险人之间信息存在严重的不对称,加之保险公司又没有良好且有效的保险代理人激励机制,导致我国机动车辆保险市场出现严重的混乱,保险代理人和保险人之间的欺诈行为就是其中最典型的现象之一,这种行为严重的影响了机动车辆保险市场的稳定和发展。鉴于此,本文将机动车保险代理人与保险人之间的欺诈博弈作为研究对象。本文首先从我国机动车辆保险的实际出发,分析机动车辆保险的特点及我国机动车辆保险市场中代理人和保险人之间的欺诈形式,欺诈动机,以及欺诈所造成的危害。再结合相关博弈论的知识和方法,通过对博弈假设条件的分析,建立相关的博弈模型,最后对博弈模型的分析,得出保险代理人和保险人博弈均衡结果,依据博弈模型的结果提出反欺诈的博弈策略。最后根据反欺诈的博弈策略进一步研究出保险人对保险代理人的有效而合理的约束和激励机制。希望能为机动车辆保险市场上代理人和保险人提供一些参考性的意见,从而保障机动车辆保险市场的健康稳定的运行。
[Abstract]:Since the resumption of insurance industry in the 20th century, the insurance industry has developed rapidly and effectively. According to the statistics of authoritative organizations, the premium income increases by 30% per year, and motor vehicle insurance is an important part of insurance.By the end of 2013, motor vehicle insurance accounted for more than 70 percent of the total insurance coverage.However, with the development of motor vehicle insurance market and economy, many serious problems also appear. According to some data of CIRC, there is serious insurance fraud in motor vehicle insurance market.The insurance fraud amount in our country accounts for more than 20% of the total insurance indemnity.This fraud not only affects the interests of insurance companies, but also affects the interests of policyholders and beneficiaries.Due to the serious asymmetry of information between insurance agents and insurers and the lack of a good and effective incentive mechanism for insurance agents in the insurance market today, there is a serious confusion in the motor vehicle insurance market in China.The fraud between insurance agents and insurers is one of the most typical phenomena, which seriously affects the stability and development of the motor vehicle insurance market.In view of this, this paper regards the fraud game between the motor vehicle insurance agent and the insurer as the research object.This paper first analyzes the characteristics of motor vehicle insurance and the form of fraud between agents and insurers in China's motor vehicle insurance market, the motive of fraud, and the harm caused by fraud.Combined with the knowledge and methods of game theory, through the analysis of the hypothetical conditions of the game, the relevant game model is established. Finally, the game model is analyzed, and the equilibrium result of insurance agent and insurer game is obtained.According to the result of game model, the game strategy of anti-fraud is put forward.Finally, according to the game strategy of anti-fraud, the effective and reasonable restraint and incentive mechanism of insurer to insurance agent is further studied.It is hoped that it can provide some reference advice for the agents and insurers in the motor vehicle insurance market so as to ensure the healthy and stable operation of the motor vehicle insurance market.
【学位授予单位】：广西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F842.4;F224.32

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