建设工程项目招投标制度研究

发布时间：2018-05-22 15:45

本文选题：招投标演化 + 低价中标　；参考：《大连理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：招投标作为国际通用的建设工程项目采购制度在我国的应用日益广泛,引入招投标制度能够促进公平竞争,促进资源的最优配置,为业主带来显著的经济效益。自2000年招投标法颁布以来,我国的关于招投标的法律制度不断完善,针对必须招标的工程范围、招投标监督的职责分工、评标委员会的构成、评标方法的选择、招标代理机构的资质认定等问题逐一颁布实施及管理办法。然而招投标在我国的应用过程中存在很多问题,最低价格招标导致竞争加剧,过低的价格产生了许多劣质工程。综合评价招标中存在投标人贿赂评标专家的问题。以上问题与投标人参加招投标时的行为动机密切相关,因此有必要从招标人和投标人决策的视角,研究现行招投标制度中存在上述问题的内在原因及如何通过制度设计激励投标人遵守规章制度以改善上述非效率问题。针对建设工程项目的招投标制度,本文分为三个部分进行分析,第一部分从制度演化角度对我国招投标发展路径进行分析,总结招投标引入我国以来的发展历程,每个阶段的历史背景、制度规定、存在的问题及下一阶段的制度改进,在此基础上分析现行招投标制度的有效性。第二部分分析承包商和监理合谋导致最低价格招标中恶意报价发生的内在机制。研究发现当监理发现由于承包商的偷工减料而引起的工程质量问题时,承包商可以选择与监理合谋以逃避返修或返工成本,因此承包商可以通过事后和监理合谋弥补事前低价中标造成的损失。分析指出监理的有限责任导致对其罚款可以但无法完全抑制其与承包商之间的合谋,提出罚款结合监理的资质管理政策能够有效地抑制合谋,从而解决最低价格招标中存在的恶意报价问题。第三部分基于拍卖的机制设计理论构建综合评价招标模型,通过分析招标人和投标人之间的博弈过程,发现在招标人的评标准则完全体现社会价值时,综合评价招标法能实现资源的有效配置并使社会收益最大化。在此基础上论证引入设置最低分数的综合评价招标法能够在维持社会收益不变的同时提高招标人的财务效率。
[Abstract]:Bidding, as an international common construction project procurement system, is widely used in our country. The introduction of bidding system can promote fair competition, promote the optimal allocation of resources and bring significant economic benefits for the owners. Since the enactment of Bidding Law in 2000, the legal system of bidding in China has been perfected continuously. The project scope of tendering, the division of duties and responsibilities of the supervision of bidding, the composition of the bid evaluation committee, the selection of bid evaluation methods, the qualification of the agency for bidding and other problems are promulgated and managed one by one. However, there are many problems in the application process of bidding in our country, the lowest price bidding leads to the intensification of competition and the low price is produced. There are many poor quality projects. The problem of bidder bribe evaluation experts in comprehensive evaluation of tender. The above problems are closely related to the behavior motivation of the bidder in the bidding. Therefore, it is necessary to study the internal causes of the problems in the current bidding system and how to adopt the system from the Perspective of the tenderer and the bidder's decision making. The bidders are encouraged to comply with the rules and regulations to improve the above non efficiency issues.
In view of the tendering and bidding system for construction projects, this paper is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes the development path of bidding in China from the perspective of institutional evolution, summarizes the development course since the introduction of our country, the historical background of each stage, the regulations of the system, the existing problems and the system improvement in the next stage. On the basis of the analysis of the validity of the current bidding system. The second part analyses the inherent mechanism of the malicious quotation occurring in the lowest price bidding by the contractor and the supervision conspiracy. The study finds that the contractor may choose to avoid rework or rework when the supervisor finds the quality of the project caused by the Contractor's work loss. The cost of rework is reworked, so the contractor can make up for the losses caused by the bid before and by the supervisor. Analysis points out that the limited liability of the supervisor can lead to a fine but can not completely restrain the conspiracy between the contractor and the contractor. In the third part, a comprehensive evaluation bidding model is constructed based on the mechanism design theory of auction. By analyzing the game process between the tenderer and the bidder, it is found that the comprehensive evaluation bidding method can realize the effective allocation of the resources and make the society be able to realize the effective allocation of the resources and make the society be able to achieve the social value by analyzing the game between the tenderer and the bidder. On the basis of this, it is proved that the comprehensive evaluation bidding method of introducing the lowest score can improve the financial efficiency of the tenderer while maintaining the social income.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F284

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