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基于信号博弈的上市房地产公司债务融资效应研究

发布时间:2018-06-10 21:05

  本文选题:信号博弈 + 债务融资 ; 参考:《哈尔滨工业大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:房地产行业是经济体系中的一个重要行业,债务融资作为房地产行业目前最常用的融资手段,不仅关系着企业发展,更关系着行业和社会经济安全,研究房地产行业债务融资所带来的效应不仅能够丰富相关理论文献,更能为企业日常经营决策提供实际借鉴。 本文针对目前我国房地产行业的发展状态以及行业特点,对整个房地产行业的情况进行了宏观上的数据分析,鉴于房地产行业在负债率这一指标上突出于其他行业这一特征,结合信号博弈相关理论,提出了高管薪酬、企业绩效和市场价值的债务融资效应的问题,并通过理论研究结合实证研究的方法,将高管薪酬与资产负债率视为管理者和所有者的内部博弈体现,将企业绩效与企业市场价值视为管理者与投资者的外部博弈体现,将企业绩效视为博弈关系的指标体现,,利用多元线性回归的方法对高管薪酬、企业绩效和市场价值与资产负债率的博弈问题进行了实证研究,再利用计量经济学联立方程模型对这几个经济特征值形成的简易经济系统进行分析,试图定性定量的得出高管薪酬、企业绩效、市场价值和债务融资比例之间相互依存、相互影响的关系。针对研究结果,并结合相关领域的理论,对所得研究结论进行利弊分析和原因分析,并结合目前的市场条件给出针对性的政策建议。 研究发现,在经营状况较好的上市房地产公司中,高管薪酬与资产负债率之间是非显著正相关的关系,而资产负债率与绩效也是非显著正相关的关系;在经营状况较差的上市房地产公司中,高管薪酬与资产负债率之间是显著负相关的关系,而资产负债率与绩效是显著正相关的关系;在所选取的样本公司中,资产负债率正向影响市值,市值负向影响资产负债率;将所选指标综合建立为一个宏观经济系统后研究则发现,管理层激励在上市房地产公司的发展中起到重要作用。根据研究结论,对于上市房地产公司内部博弈的负面效应,提出应该强化委托代理的契约关系和明确资金使用计划的建议,而对于上市房地产公司外部博弈的负面效应,则提出了应该为投资者和债权人提供监督空间以及平衡长短期债务融资比例的建议。
[Abstract]:The real estate industry is an important industry in the economic system. As the most commonly used financing means of the real estate industry, debt financing is not only related to the development of enterprises, but also related to the industry and social economic security. The study of the effects of debt financing in real estate industry can not only enrich the relevant theoretical literature, but also provide practical reference for the daily business decisions of enterprises. This paper aims at the development status and characteristics of the real estate industry in China. Based on the macro data analysis of the whole real estate industry, in view of the fact that the debt ratio of the real estate industry is prominent in other industries, combined with the signal game theory, the paper puts forward the executive compensation. The problem of debt financing effect of enterprise performance and market value, and through theoretical research combined with empirical research method, the executive compensation and asset-liability ratio are regarded as the internal game between manager and owner. This paper regards enterprise performance and enterprise market value as the external game between manager and investor, and regards enterprise performance as the index of game relation. The paper uses multiple linear regression method to analyze executive compensation. This paper makes an empirical study on the game problem of enterprise performance, market value and asset-liability ratio, and then analyzes the simple economic system formed by these economic characteristic values by using the econometric simultaneous equation model. This paper tries to get the relationship between executive compensation, firm performance, market value and debt financing ratio. According to the research results, combined with the theory of related fields, the advantages and disadvantages of the conclusions and the reasons are analyzed, and combined with the current market conditions to give targeted policy recommendations. In listed real estate companies with good operating conditions, the relationship between executive compensation and asset-liability ratio is non-significant positive correlation, and the relationship between asset-liability ratio and performance is also non-significant positive correlation. In listed real estate companies with poor operating conditions, the relationship between executive compensation and asset-liability ratio is significantly negative, while the relationship between asset-liability ratio and performance is significantly positive. The asset-liability ratio positively affects market value and market value negatively affects asset-liability ratio, and the research shows that management incentive plays an important role in the development of listed real estate companies by synthesizing the selected indexes into a macroeconomic system. According to the conclusion of the study, for the negative effects of the internal game of listed real estate companies, this paper puts forward the suggestion that the contract relationship of principal-agent should be strengthened and the plan of capital utilization should be clarified, while the negative effects of external game on listed real estate companies. It suggests that investors and creditors should be given room to monitor and balance the ratio of long-and short-term debt financing.
【学位授予单位】:哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F299.233.42;F224.32

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