碳排放中政府与企业博弈分析

发布时间：2018-07-07 18:59

本文选题：碳排放 + 中央政府　；参考：《中共中央党校》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：摘要：2013年世界气象组织在《2012年温室气体公报》中指出，从1990年到2012年，由于二氧化碳、甲烷和一氧化二氮等其它吸热气体的排放，全球气候暖化效应增加了32%，而主要化石燃料排放的二氧化碳占这一增量的80%。同时，从2011年到2012年，大气中二氧化碳的增幅超过了过去十年的平均增速。据统计，中国在2007年就已是全球温室气体第一排放大国。2011年，中国人均碳排放量已超出全球平均水平的28%。因此，国际和国内都面临严峻的减排压力。本文研究碳排放中中央政府、地方政府与企业三者之间的关系。中央政府作为节能减排的政策制定者，，地方政府作为碳排放的监督者，企业则作为碳排放主体。在碳排放过程中，中央政府，地方政府以及企业为实现自身利益最大化会展开博弈。各自利益出发点的差异是碳排放中中央政府、地方政府以及企业博弈的动因。同时，在碳排放中，地方政府与企业之间有某种利益相关性，它们会违背中央政府节能减排的意愿，进行合作博弈，即政企共谋。通过建立碳排放中“中央政府—地方政府—企业”之间的三层博弈模型，定量分析地方政府与企业的最优均衡协议和中央政府防备政企共谋协议，并论证允许政企共谋和防备政企共谋的条件。最后得出结论：在中央政府无约束的条件下，地方政府与企业之间会共谋；如果中央政府想防备政企共谋，需要尽量减少政企共谋收益；为防备政企共谋，中央政府设计一套激励相容的约束机制非常必要；加强第四方媒体的监督对中央政府防备政企共谋有利。政企共谋可以给企业以及地方政府带来短期利益，但更会对其产生不利影响。为更有效控制碳排放量，中央政府可以建立完善的财政管理体制、有效的权力监督机制以及一套“绿色”政绩考核规制来约束地方政府行为。中央政府也可以从清晰界定产权、征收碳税税种、建立碳排放权交易机制以及慎重使用经济强制措施等政策工具，同时，也可以鼓励企业技术创新，拓宽企业融资渠道、营造减排良好环境和建立减排专项基金等经济杠杆鼓励企业碳减排。中央政府也需要发挥第四方媒体的监督作用。最后，我们也要充分发挥国际环保非政府组织的重要作用。
[Abstract]:Abstract: the 2013 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) stated in the greenhouse Gas Bulletin 2012 that from 1990 to 2012, due to emissions of other endothermic gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, Global warming has increased by 32 percent, while carbon dioxide emissions from major fossil fuels account for 80 percent of the increase. Meanwhile, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere grew faster than the average over the past decade from 2011 to 2012. According to statistics, China was the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2007. In 2011, China's per capita carbon emissions exceeded the global average of 28 percent. Therefore, both international and domestic are faced with severe pressure to reduce emissions. This paper studies the relationship among central government, local government and enterprises. The central government is the policy maker of energy saving and emission reduction, the local government is the monitor of carbon emission, and the enterprise is the main carbon emitter. In the process of carbon emissions, the central government, local governments and enterprises will play a game to maximize their own interests. The difference in the starting point of their respective interests is the motivation of the game between central government, local government and enterprises. At the same time, in carbon emissions, local governments and enterprises have a certain interest correlation, they will go against the central government's willingness to save energy and reduce emissions, to carry out cooperative game, that is, government and enterprise collusion. Through the establishment of a three-layer game model between "central government, local government and enterprise" in carbon emissions, quantitative analysis of the optimal equilibrium agreement between local government and enterprise and the agreement between central government against complicity of government and enterprise, It also demonstrates the conditions for allowing the government and enterprises to collude and to guard against the complicity of the government and enterprises. Finally, the conclusion is drawn: under the condition that the central government has no constraints, local governments and enterprises will collude; if the central government wants to guard against the complicity of government and enterprises, it needs to minimize the benefits of government and enterprise complicity; to guard against government and enterprise complicity, It is necessary for the central government to design an incentive and compatible restraint mechanism; it is beneficial for the central government to strengthen the supervision of the fourth party media against the collusion of the government and enterprises. Government-enterprise collusion can bring short-term benefits to enterprises and local governments, but will have a negative impact on them. To control carbon emissions more effectively, the central government can establish a sound financial management system, an effective power supervision mechanism and a set of "green" performance assessment regulation to restrain local government behavior. The central government can also clearly define property rights, levy a carbon tax, establish a trading mechanism for carbon emissions rights, and prudently use economic coercive measures. At the same time, it can also encourage enterprises to innovate in technology and broaden their financing channels. Economic levers such as creating a good environment for reducing emissions and establishing special funds to reduce emissions encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. The central government also needs to play a fourth-party media oversight role. Finally, we should also give full play to the important role of international environmental non-governmental organizations.
【学位授予单位】：中共中央党校
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F205;F123.15

【参考文献】