城市基础设施公私合作模式中的政府监管机制研究——基于参与主体之间的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-07-31 17:43

【摘要】：该文基于博弈论的视角,通过分析政府与企业的KMRW声誉博弈、中介机构违规上报的博弈和政府尽职检查的博弈情况,来分析公私合作模式的监管机制中政府、中介机构与私人企业三者之间的博弈关系。结果表明:声誉缺失可能引起私人企业维持声誉的动力不足,导致提供的城市基础设施不符合社会公众意愿,政府部门应建立声誉测量机制、奖惩机制和动态补贴机制,达到自我约束和监督的目的,并使得企业获得合理利润水平;私人企业的违约类型的先验概率越高,私人企业与中介机构违规上报的概率越小,政府部门应建立中介机构考核体系,降低中介机构的违规概率。
[Abstract]:Based on the game theory, this paper analyzes the KMRW reputation game between the government and the enterprise, the game reported by the intermediary organization and the game of the government due diligence, to analyze the government in the supervision mechanism of the public-private cooperation model. The game relationship between intermediary and private enterprise. The results show that the lack of reputation may lead to the lack of incentive for private enterprises to maintain their reputation, which leads to the provision of urban infrastructure that does not meet the public's wishes. Government departments should establish reputation measurement mechanisms, reward and punishment mechanisms and dynamic subsidy mechanisms. The higher the priori probability of the private enterprise's default type, the smaller the probability of the private enterprise and the intermediary organization to report the violation of the rules, and to achieve the goal of self-restraint and supervision, and to make the enterprise obtain the reasonable profit level, and the higher the priori probability of the private enterprise's default type is, Government departments should set up the examination system of intermediary organizations to reduce the probability of breaking regulations.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学管理学院;复旦大学管理科学工程博士后流动站;
【基金】：2013年教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC630196)
【分类号】：F299.24;F283

【参考文献】