政府投资项目代建模式激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-08-27 18:46

【摘要】：伴随着不断深化的投资体制改革,我国开始在政府投资项目中逐渐推广代建制管理模式。在我国现行的代建制模式中,政府投资人和代建人是通过订立代建合同来确定委托代理关系的。然而在代建制实施过程中,其应具有的效果不能完全发挥。这是因为代建双方掌握的信息量并不对等,从而容易产生代建人道德风险问题和逆向选择的问题。代建制的重点是以激励约束机制为基础,所以本文分析代建制的实施情况,对现有的委托代理关系进行研究,尝试设计一种更为有效的激励机制,能够同时考虑政府投资人和代建人的利益,并且使代建人的行为更加规范,尽量降低由委托代理问题给投资项目带来的效益损失,更好地实现政府投资人希望达到的目标,使代建制这一制度措施可以更为高效的满足实际需求。本文主要采用的研究方法有文献查阅法、层次分析法、系统分析法等,通过使用这些方法,对代建制中存在的问题和代建人的选择模式、代建制显性激励机制以及隐性激励机制等方面进行了深入探讨：(1)对代建模式中的委托代理关系和代建人的绩效评价进行研究。首先,分析了我国政府投资项目代建制中双方的委托代理关系。其次,对代建人绩效评价的内容进行了研究。再次,对代建人绩效评价的指标体系做了主要分析。最后,对代建人绩效评价的方法进行了分析。(2)分析并研究了代建模式的激励机制,并对其进行改进设计。首先,对目前代建模式的不足和代建模式的特殊性进行分析。其次,对代建模式激励机制的各因素效果进行研究。再次,分别从显性激励和隐性激励对代建人的激励模式进行研究,并考虑有关工程质量的激励机制。最后,针对目前我国各地区代建制激励机制的现状,分别从显性激励、隐性激励、法律与政策、代建人市场等方面,提出对代建制激励机制的改进。(3)针对西安市某中学教育综合楼代建项目,分析了该代建项目中存在的问题,根据激励机制提出解决办法,并观察效果。首先,对代建合同中的激励内容进行分析与完善。其次,对案例中的绩效考评内容进行研究,发现问题并提出建议。再次,对案例中存在的其他问题进行总结并提出解决办法。最后,对完善后的结果进行观察,使激励机制能够充分发挥其应有的作用。
[Abstract]:With the deepening reform of the investment system, the agent construction management mode has been gradually popularized in the government investment projects in China. In the current agent construction mode, the government investors and the agent constructors determine the principal-agent relationship by signing the agent construction contract. This is because the amount of information that the agent and the construction party have is not equal, so it is easy to produce the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection of the agent. Effective incentive mechanism can consider the interests of both government investors and agent builders at the same time, and make the behavior of agent builders more standardized, minimize the loss of benefits brought by the principal-agent problem to investment projects, better achieve the objectives that the government investors want to achieve, so that the agent construction system measures can be more efficient to meet the reality. The main research methods used in this paper are literature consulting method, analytic hierarchy process, system analysis method, etc. By using these methods, the problems existing in the agent construction system and the selection mode of the agent, the explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism of the agent construction system are discussed in depth. (1) The principal-agent in the agent modeling mode is discussed. Firstly, the principal-agent relationship between the two sides in the agent construction system of government investment projects is analyzed. Secondly, the content of agent performance evaluation is studied. Thirdly, the index system of agent performance evaluation is analyzed. Finally, the method of agent performance evaluation is discussed. (2) Analyze and study the incentive mechanism of agent modeling, and improve the design. Firstly, analyze the shortcomings of the current model and the particularity of the model. Secondly, study the effect of each factor of the incentive mechanism of agent modeling. Thirdly, advance the incentive model of agent from explicit incentive and implicit incentive respectively. Finally, in view of the current situation of the incentive mechanism of the agent construction system in various regions of China, the paper puts forward the improvement of the incentive mechanism of the agent construction system from the aspects of explicit incentive, implicit incentive, law and policy, agent market and so on. (3) Aiming at a middle school education building agent construction project in Xi'an, the paper analyzes the incentive mechanism of the agent construction system. First of all, the incentive content in the contract is analyzed and perfected. Secondly, the content of performance evaluation in the case is studied, problems are found and suggestions are put forward. Thirdly, other problems in the case are summarized and solved. Finally, we will observe the improved results, so that the incentive mechanism can give full play to its due role.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F283

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