基于多属性逆向拍卖的节能服务公司选择研究

发布时间：2018-09-19 12:55

【摘要】：合同能源管理是一种新型的节能机制,节能服务需求方与节能服务公司通过合作共享收益。合同能源管理实施的一个难点是节能服务公司(ESCO)的选择,然而,相关研究尚不充分。本文以政府为节能服务需求方,基于多属性逆向拍卖模型研究了ESCO选择问题。ESCO的投标集由三个属性决定,即节能量、项目完成期以及节能收益分享比例。本文通过非合作博弈研究政府和多ESCO间的逆向拍卖行为,将利润分享比例作为能源节省量与项目提前期的函数,我们推导出各ESCO的最优投标策略;在此基础上,每一个ESCO可以通过自身的技术与能力来决定投标策略;于是,在不忽视利润分享的前提下,政府可以依据能源节省量与项目提起期来挑选最优的ESCO。这种ESCO选择机制回避了节能收益分配的谈判,限制了ESCO间的恶意竞争,从而提高了整个合同能源管理过程的运作效率。仿真研究显示,ESCO数量的增加会降低各方的收益,于是,政府有必要限制参与逆向拍卖的ESCO数量。
[Abstract]:Contract energy management is a new energy saving mechanism. One of the difficulties in the implementation of contract energy management is the choice of energy-saving service company (ESCO). However, the related research is not sufficient. Based on the multi-attribute reverse auction model, the bidding set of ESCO is determined by three attributes, that is, energy saving, project completion period and energy saving benefit sharing ratio. In this paper, the reverse auction behavior between government and multiple ESCO is studied by non-cooperative game, and the proportion of profit sharing is taken as a function of energy saving and project lead time, and the optimal bidding strategy of each ESCO is deduced. Each ESCO can decide the bidding strategy through its own technology and ability; therefore, without neglecting the profit sharing, the government can select the optimal ESCO. based on the amount of energy savings and the project initiation date. This ESCO selection mechanism avoids the negotiation of energy saving benefit distribution, limits the malicious competition among ESCO, and improves the operation efficiency of the whole contract energy management process. Simulation studies show that the increase in the number of ESCO will reduce the benefits of all parties, so it is necessary for the government to limit the number of ESCO participating in reverse auctions.
【作者单位】：中国科学技术大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271195,71322101) 安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKY2014D28)
【分类号】：F206;F713.359

【参考文献】