PPP项目中政府套牢社会资本问题分析

发布时间：2018-09-19 13:10

【摘要】：PPP (Public-Private Partnership)模式称为公私合作模式,是指政府和私人投资者之间为了向社会公众提供某种产品或者服务,达成的一种长期的伙伴关系。伴随着我国经济发展,大量的基础设施及公共服务需求和政府有限的财政能力之间的矛盾愈加突出,在基础设施和公共服务领域引入社会资本成为解决这一矛盾的有效途径。早在上世纪80年代就有民营资本以BOT等模式参与我国的基础设施建设,随着新一届政府的上台,为了应对地方政府债务危机和经济下行压力,政府对PPP的推动力度不断加码,但是市场却反映出“冷热不均”的状况,相对政府的主动,社会资本却表现的很犹豫,而政府部门的套牢风险是社会资本犹豫不决的重要原因之一本文在对前人研究分析的基础之上,首先对PPP模式和套牢问题的相关理论进行了梳理。接着从PPP项目中资产的专用性、契约不完全性以及政府的机会主义行为等几个方面分析PPP项目中政府套牢问题产生的机理。在前文分析的基础上,运用动态博弈的方法,构建PPP项目中政府和私人投资者之间的博弈套牢模型,讨论政府选择套牢私人投资者的条件,比较不同均衡路径下私人投资者的努力程度。并且结合分析结果和套牢问题的经典治理方式为解决套牢问题提供相应对策。在国家大力推广PPP模式的背景下,针对PPP项目中存在的“政府套牢私人投资者”这样的“痛点”研究具有积极的意义。
[Abstract]:PPP (Public-Private Partnership) mode is called public-private partnership, which is a long-term partnership between government and private investors in order to provide a certain product or service to the public. With the economic development of our country, the contradiction between a large number of infrastructure and public service demand and the limited financial ability of the government becomes more and more prominent, and the introduction of social capital in the field of infrastructure and public service becomes an effective way to solve this contradiction. As early as the 1980s, private capital participated in the infrastructure construction of our country in the mode of BOT and so on. With the coming into power of the new government, in order to cope with the debt crisis of local governments and the downward pressure of the economy, the government's push to the PPP has been continuously increased. However, the market reflects the "uneven balance of cold and heat". Compared with the initiative of the government, social capital is hesitant. And the risk of the government is one of the important reasons of social capital hesitancy. Based on the previous research and analysis, this paper firstly combs the PPP model and the relevant theory of the problem. Then it analyzes the mechanism of the problem of government entrapment in the PPP project from the aspects of the specificity of the assets the incompleteness of the contract and the opportunistic behavior of the government in the PPP project. On the basis of the previous analysis, using the method of dynamic game, this paper constructs a game locking model between the government and private investors in PPP project, and discusses the conditions for the government to choose to hold private investors. Compare the efforts of private investors under different equilibrium paths. Combined with the analysis results and the classical governance of the locking problem, the corresponding countermeasures are provided for solving the latch problem. Under the background of popularizing the PPP model in China, it is of positive significance to study the "pain point" of "government holding private investors" in the PPP project.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F283

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