基于委托代理理论的虚拟企业知识共享激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-10-05 17:54

【摘要】：知识经济时代，知识成为了最重要的生产要素，变化莫测的市场环境和不确定性因素，使得以知识共享抓住市场目标并分担风险的虚拟企业应运而生。虚拟企业是由诸多企业所形成的知识联盟，知识共享体现了其存在的价值，调动各成员企业积极主动的共享知识是虚拟企业管理者的责任和义务。设计一套合理有效的激励机制对于虚拟企业的成败至关重要。因此，本文主要选择了虚拟企业知识共享的激励机制为研究问题。首先，论文重新阐释了虚拟企业知识共享相关的基本概念，对委托代理理论、激励机制相关理论进行了归纳总结。将知识生产函数引入到虚拟企业的相关研究当中，方便了后续的定量化建模研究。其次，本文利用委托代理理论和博弈论等理论建立了虚拟企业知识共享的基本激励模型，并在此基础上建立了引入成员企业竞争对手相对业绩的信号、知识共享努力水平的监督信号、虚拟企业公平偏好等因素的激励机制模型。通过算例来检验了模型的适用性，并根据模型及算例的求解结果对比得出了虚拟企业知识共享激励机制设计和改善的相关启示建议。再次，针对虚拟企业知识共享中出现的搭便车现象，利用博弈论和委托代理理论建立模型，按照替罪羊思想和引入二级委托人的思想设计了防范虚拟企业知识共享搭便车的相关措施。最后，针对虚拟企业的知识共享激励的棘轮效应建立了数学模型，并提出了弱化棘轮效应的措施，，提供了相关的管理建议。希望通过本文的研究，能为虚拟企业知识共享激励机制的设计和改善提供一定的启发。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, knowledge has become the most important factor of production. The unpredictable market environment and uncertain factors make the virtual enterprise with knowledge sharing grasp the market goal and share the risk as the times require. Virtual enterprise is a knowledge alliance formed by many enterprises. Knowledge sharing embodies the value of its existence. It is the responsibility and obligation of managers of virtual enterprises to mobilize the active sharing of knowledge among member enterprises. Designing a set of reasonable and effective incentive mechanism is very important to the success or failure of virtual enterprise. Therefore, this paper mainly chooses the incentive mechanism of virtual enterprise knowledge sharing as the research problem. Firstly, the paper reinterprets the basic concepts of knowledge sharing in virtual enterprises and summarizes the principal-agent theory and incentive mechanism theory. The knowledge production function is introduced into the related research of virtual enterprise, which facilitates the quantitative modeling research. Secondly, based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper establishes the basic incentive model of knowledge sharing in virtual enterprises, and on this basis, establishes the signal of introducing relative performance of competitors of member enterprises. The incentive mechanism model of factors such as knowledge sharing effort level supervision signal, virtual enterprise fairness preference and so on. The applicability of the model is tested by a numerical example, and the relevant enlightening suggestions for the design and improvement of the incentive mechanism of knowledge sharing in virtual enterprise are obtained by comparing the results of the model and the solution of the example. Thirdly, aiming at the free-rider phenomenon in virtual enterprise knowledge sharing, the model is established by using game theory and principal-agent theory. According to the idea of scapegoat and the idea of introducing secondary clients, the measures to prevent virtual enterprises from sharing knowledge and hitchhiking are designed. Finally, the mathematical model of ratchet effect of knowledge sharing incentive in virtual enterprise is established, and the measures to weaken ratchet effect are put forward, and relevant management suggestions are provided. It is hoped that the research in this paper can provide some inspiration for the design and improvement of knowledge sharing incentive mechanism in virtual enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：西安电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272;F224.32

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