药品价格规制中的政府间博弈分析

发布时间：2018-10-19 11:08

【摘要】：以药品最高零售限价为主的药品价格规制机制失灵的根本原因应该从规制的源头即政府的作为找起。本文通过建立反映中央政府与地方政府在药品价格规制机制中作用的委托-代理模型对其行为进行分析,发现药品价格规制机制在当前考核体系下会对地方政府形成扭曲激励,地方政府因而会罔顾社会总福利的损失,消极应对中央政府的政令;当前中央政府与地方政府的财力分配格局,使得激励的扭曲效应在短期内无法消除。因此,中央政府应尽快放开药品价格管制、放弃药品价格最高零售限价政策,从改革政绩考核模式入手,并通过地方政府财政给付抵消现有机制内在的激励扭曲,让改革的成果真正惠及黎民百姓。
[Abstract]:The root cause of the failure of the drug price regulation mechanism, which is dominated by the maximum retail price of drugs, should be found from the source of the regulation, that is, the government's action. By establishing a principal-agent model which reflects the role of central government and local government in the mechanism of drug price regulation, this paper analyzes its behavior and finds that the mechanism of drug price regulation will form a distorted incentive to local government under the current assessment system. As a result, local governments will ignore the loss of general social welfare and respond negatively to the central government's decrees. The current pattern of distribution of financial resources between central and local governments makes the distorting effect of incentives impossible to be eliminated in the short term. Therefore, the central government should liberalize drug price control as soon as possible, abandon the policy of maximum retail price limit for drug prices, start with the reform of the performance assessment model, and counteract the inherent incentives and distortions of the existing mechanism through local government financial payments. Let the fruits of reform really benefit the people of Li Min.
【作者单位】：江西财经大学产业经济研究院;南昌大学建筑工程学院;江西外语外贸职业学院国际商务系;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目,项目编号:71363020 江西省研究生创新专项基金项目,项目编号:YC2013-B052 江西财经大学研究生创新项目“战略性新兴产业人力资本安全预警研究”资助
【分类号】：D630;F224.32

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