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政府投资项目代建人激励模型及管理机制研究

发布时间:2018-12-25 13:18
【摘要】:政府投资项目在推动国民经济发展,满足文化和国防需求等方面发挥着极为重要的作用。为了加快政府投资项目市场化的前进方向,国务院于2004年提出对非经营政府投资项目加快推行代建制。代建人作为这项制度创新的关键因素,有必要研究如何对代建人进行激励,提高代建人的项目管理水平。 本文首先研究了我国政府投资政策的演进历程,从计划经济向市场经济转变的过程中,代建制的提出符合市场化的前进方向。在代建制初步引入阶段,对代建人的激励方法,强调的责任,忽视奖励,缺乏可操作性;在快速成长阶段,主要激励方法是奖励部分的项目结余资金。物质奖励和惩罚的效果都差强人意,所以本文探讨对代建人的精神激励。第二,通过构建代建人的声誉激励模型,模拟政府对一个代建人进行多次激励的过程,识别影响代建人精神激励的主要因素,并证明了引入声誉机制之后对代建人的激励效果有显著的提升。第三,通过构建代建人的锦标制度模型,得出政府对多个代建人进行声誉激励时应注意代建人初始激励、最优工资和激励阀值的确定,并证明了锦标制度可以减少信息不对称性和环境不确定因素对代建人声誉激励的影响。最后,本文构建了虚拟的代建人激励管理组织,在此基础上提出代建人的长效激励方法、声誉传播方法、科学评价方法和资质认证方法。按照流程化的机制设计思路,从激励管理流程、激励效果分析和激励效果反馈这三个方面设计了代建人的激励管理运行机制,并提出代建人资质认证的原则、流程、审查和公示机制,作为代建人激励管理机制的配套措施。 本文构建了对代建人进行精神激励的模型,期望通过政府部门对代建人的精神激励,提高代建人在政府投资代建项目中的努力程度,保证代建项目的顺利实施,严格控制代建项目的投资、质量和工期,促进我国政府投资代建制的进一步完善。
[Abstract]:Government investment projects play an extremely important role in promoting the development of national economy and meeting the needs of culture and national defense. In order to speed up the orientation of marketization of government investment projects, the State Council proposed in 2004 to speed up the implementation of the agency system for non-operating government investment projects. As the key factor of this system innovation, it is necessary to study how to motivate the agent to improve the project management level of the agent. This paper first studies the evolution course of government investment policy in our country. In the process of transition from planned economy to market economy, the agent system is put forward in accordance with the direction of marketization. In the initial introduction stage of agent construction, the incentive method of the agent emphasizes the responsibility, neglects the reward, and lacks maneuverability; in the rapid growth stage, the main incentive method is the project balance fund of the reward part. The effect of material reward and punishment is not satisfactory. Secondly, by constructing the reputation incentive model of the agent, the paper simulates the process of the government to motivate the agent many times, and identifies the main factors that affect the spiritual incentive of the agent. It also proves that the incentive effect of the agent is improved significantly after introducing reputation mechanism. Thirdly, by constructing the model of the agent's title system, it is concluded that the government should pay attention to the determination of the initial incentive, the optimal wage and the incentive threshold when the government encourages the reputation of the multi-agent. It is proved that the award system can reduce the influence of information asymmetry and environmental uncertainty on the reputation incentive of the agent. Finally, this paper constructs the virtual agent incentive management organization, and puts forward the long-term incentive method, reputation dissemination method, scientific evaluation method and qualification certification method. According to the thought of mechanism design, this paper designs the operating mechanism of incentive management from three aspects: incentive management flow, incentive effect analysis and incentive effect feedback, and puts forward the principle and process of agent qualification certification. Review and publicity mechanism, as a proxy incentive management mechanism supporting measures. In this paper, a model of spiritual incentive for agent is constructed, which is expected to improve the degree of effort of agent in government investment and guarantee the smooth implementation of agency project through the spirit incentive of government departments. Strictly control the investment, quality and time limit of the agent construction project, and promote the further improvement of our government investment agency system.
【学位授予单位】:华北电力大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F283

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