二级供应链中CSR运作：相互激励配置与合作

发布时间：2019-02-24 14:04

【摘要】：基于Baron为代表的战略CSR观点,考虑一条由上游制造商和下游零售商构成的两级供应链,假设消费者对企业社会责任(CSR)行为具有积极反应和节点企业的CSR行为先于中间产品交易行为,分别建立和求解了竞争性的中间产品市场和双边合同(批发价合同)两种中间产品交易方式下三阶段动态供应链运作博弈模型。两种产品交易方式下的均衡社会业绩和经济业绩之间的比较结果表明,(1)产品双边合同交易是上游制造商实施CSR行为的必要条件;(2)足够高的制造商社会责任行为效率是节点企业(制造商和零售商)通过中间产品双边合同交易同时提高供应链CSR业绩和经济业绩的一个充分条件。基于上述结论基础,更具体地研究双边合同交易方式,用制造商和零售商是否被要求实施CSR行为来描述供应链中的CSR配置,分别建立求解了三种CSR配置下的三阶段非合作运作模型。相应的均衡社会业绩和经济业绩之间的比较结果表明,由于制造商和零售商的CSR行为之间的策略性互补导致的相互激励机制,无论供应链中的初始CSR配置如何,制造商和零售商各自为自己的CSR行为负责,并获得较高的经济业绩和社会业绩。进一步地,利用Nash讨价还价模型描述合作背景下的CSR行为和批发价格合同谈判,相应的Nash讨价还价解显示,由于合作的运作方式可以克服非合作运作中存在于产品交易阶段的双重加价的问题和CSR策略性行为互动阶段的CSR行为动机不足问题,从而可以进一步提高社会业绩和经济业绩。并且由于节点企业之间的激励机制,因此节点企业在中间产品双边交易阶段的合作一定会引致CSR行为阶段的合作。揭示了在供应链合作中,产品交易阶段的合作对节点企业的社会责任具有更重要的激励作用。这些结果在消费者对供应链整体CSR行为具有积极反应的条件下,一方面为解决“哪个节点企业应当对供应链整体的社会责任行为负责”这一争议提供了一个理论回应;另一方面,指出供应链中的CSR行为的管理,重点不是CSR在供应链中如何配置,而在于是否采用合作的运作方式。
[Abstract]:Based on the strategic CSR perspective represented by Baron, a two-tier supply chain consisting of upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers is considered. Assuming that consumers have a positive response to CSR (CSR) behavior and that the CSR behavior of nodal enterprises precedes intermediate product trading behavior, The three-stage dynamic supply chain operation game model under competitive intermediate product market and bilateral contract (wholesale price contract) is established and solved respectively. The results show that: (1) bilateral contract transaction is a necessary condition for upstream manufacturers to carry out CSR behavior; (2) sufficiently high efficiency of manufacturer's social responsibility behavior is a sufficient condition for node enterprises (manufacturers and retailers) to improve the CSR performance and economic performance of supply chain simultaneously through bilateral contract transaction of intermediate products. Based on the above conclusions, this paper studies the bilateral contract transaction more concretely, and describes the CSR configuration in the supply chain by using whether the manufacturer and retailer are required to implement the CSR behavior. Three-stage non-cooperative operation models for three CSR configurations are established. The corresponding comparison between balanced social performance and economic performance shows that the strategic complementation of the CSR behavior between manufacturers and retailers leads to mutual incentives, regardless of the initial CSR allocation in the supply chain. Manufacturers and retailers are responsible for their own CSR behavior and achieve higher economic and social performance. Furthermore, the Nash bargaining model is used to describe the CSR behavior and wholesale price contract negotiation in the context of cooperation. The corresponding Nash bargaining solution shows that, Because the cooperative mode of operation can overcome the problem of double price increase existing in the stage of product transaction in non-cooperative operation and the problem of insufficient motivation of CSR in the interactive stage of strategic behavior of CSR, it can further improve social and economic performance. And because of the incentive mechanism between the node enterprises, the cooperation of the node enterprises in the intermediate product bilateral transaction stage will certainly lead to the cooperation of the CSR behavior phase. It is revealed that in the supply chain cooperation, the cooperation in the product transaction stage plays a more important role in stimulating the social responsibility of the nodal enterprises. These results provide a theoretical response to the dispute of which node enterprises should be responsible for the overall CSR behavior of the supply chain under the condition that consumers have a positive response to the overall CSR behavior of the supply chain. On the other hand, it is pointed out that the management of CSR behavior in supply chain is not how to configure CSR in supply chain, but whether to adopt cooperative operation mode.
【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F224.32

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