技术创新补贴和碳税约束下政府与企业行为博弈研究
发布时间：2019-02-25 08:26
【摘要】：政府碳排放政策是影响企业进行减排的重要措施。本文构建了政府和两个企业之间的一主两从Stackelberg博弈模型和企业之间的Duopoly博弈模型,在考虑碳税和技术创新补贴的环境调控政策下,将这两个模型结合起来,以社会福利最大化为目标,运用逆向归纳法求解分析企业自主创新和合作创新两种模式下技术创新投入、政府技术创新补贴、碳税以及社会福利之间的关系。研究结论可以支持政府制订科学合理的环境规制政策。
[Abstract]:The government carbon emission policy is an important measure to affect enterprises to reduce emissions. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model between the government and the two enterprises and the Duopoly game model between the enterprises are constructed. The two models are combined under the environmental regulation policy considering carbon tax and technological innovation subsidy. Aiming at the maximization of social welfare, this paper analyzes the relationship between technological innovation input, government subsidy for technological innovation, carbon tax and social welfare under the two models of independent innovation and cooperative innovation by using reverse induction method. The conclusion can support the government to formulate scientific and reasonable environmental regulation policy.
【作者单位】： 东南大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大招标项目(12&ZD207) 国家自然科学基金项目(71172044);国家自然科学基金项目(71273047) 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2014ZDAXM002) 东南大学基本科研业务费资助项目(2242015S32003,2242014S20070)阶段性成果
【分类号】：F123.15
[Abstract]:The government carbon emission policy is an important measure to affect enterprises to reduce emissions. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model between the government and the two enterprises and the Duopoly game model between the enterprises are constructed. The two models are combined under the environmental regulation policy considering carbon tax and technological innovation subsidy. Aiming at the maximization of social welfare, this paper analyzes the relationship between technological innovation input, government subsidy for technological innovation, carbon tax and social welfare under the two models of independent innovation and cooperative innovation by using reverse induction method. The conclusion can support the government to formulate scientific and reasonable environmental regulation policy.
【作者单位】： 东南大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大招标项目(12&ZD207) 国家自然科学基金项目(71172044);国家自然科学基金项目(71273047) 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2014ZDAXM002) 东南大学基本科研业务费资助项目(2242015S32003,2242014S20070)阶段性成果
【分类号】：F123.15
【参考文献】
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