机构投资者持股、高管权力与现金分红研究

发布时间：2019-07-08 11:09

【摘要】：上市公司不分红或少分红一直是我国资本市场治理的热点和难点问题。笔者将管理权力理论纳入现金分红治理研究框架,利用A股上市公司2009—2013年数据为样本对高管权力集中与上市公司现金分红之间的关系进行实证检验,并探究机构投资者在其中的治理作用。研究发现,高管权力集中公司现金分红的可能性小、支付的现金红利较少;进一步研究发现,机构投资者可以促进高管权力集中上市公司的现金分红,抑制高管权力集中产生的代理问题。该研究拓展了我国资本市场现金分红治理的研究视角,丰富了股利理论的研究文献。引导机构投资者积极发挥外部治理作用、逐步完善高管权力制衡机制以及将现金分红水平纳入高管绩效评价体系或写进高管薪酬契约将有助于解决上市公司的不分红或少分红难题。
[Abstract]:No dividend or little dividend of listed companies has always been a hot and difficult issue in the governance of capital market in China. The author brings the theory of management power into the research framework of cash dividend governance, uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2013 as samples to test the relationship between executive power concentration and cash dividend of listed companies, and explores the governance role of institutional investors in it. It is found that the cash dividend of the executive power concentration company is less likely and the cash dividend paid is less. It is found that institutional investors can promote the cash dividend of the listed company with the executive power concentration and restrain the agency problem caused by the executive power concentration. This study expands the research perspective of cash dividend management in China's capital market and enriches the research literature of dividend theory. Guiding institutional investors to play an active role in external governance, gradually improving the mechanism of executive power checks and balances and integrating the cash dividend level into the executive performance evaluation system or written into the executive compensation contract will help to solve the problem of no dividend or less dividend in listed companies.
【作者单位】：天津财经大学;山东理工大学;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“经济周期、融资约束与营运资本的动态协同选择”(项目号:71302114)
【分类号】：F275;F224

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