上市公司高管过度自信对现金股利政策的影响

发布时间：2017-12-31 05:19

本文关键词：上市公司高管过度自信对现金股利政策的影响　出处：《天津大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国上市公司中过度自信的高管普遍存在，，他们所做出的非理性现金股利决策不仅损害了投资者或者股东的利益，而且还可能阻碍公司的发展。基于此，本文在对国内外有关研究文献进行回归和梳理的基础上，摒弃了经典财务理论中理性经理人的假设。文章试图利用我国沪、深两市2010—2012年A股上市公司发布的财务数据，以行为财务学的相关理论为指引，实证检验我国高管过度自信这一心理因素与公司现金股利分配政策之间的关系，及公司成长性和股权结构这两个公司特征对上述关系产生的影响。过度自信的度量尚未形成统一的标准是制约该理论发展的一大瓶颈，本文将规范研究和实证研究相结合，在第三章首先通过演绎推理初步论证了采用公司的年度盈余预测偏差程度作为高管过度自信的连续替代变量的可行性和合理性，进而通过构建恰当的数学模型理论分析了高管过度自信的心理偏好对现金股利决策的影响机理，在此基础上提出值得深入探讨的三个核心命题。第四章实证部分选用2010—2012年沪深两市发布了盈利预测的A股上市公司为研究样本，在控制公司系列特征变量的基础上，运用多元回归模型探求了我国上市公司中高管过度自信的心理偏好对现金股利分配行为的影响，研究结果表明：管理者过度自信的公司倾向于少发放现金股利来增强内部融资；且当公司具有越高的成长机会时，其降低公司现金股利分配水平的倾向会更加明显，即公司的成长性加强了公司高管过度自信对现金股利分配决策的影响；但制衡性的股权分布能够在一定程度上避免因高管过度自信引起的减少发放现金股利的非理性行为。根据实证研究结论，文章最后针对性地提出了帮助我国上市公司克服高管过度自信所产生的不利影响的几点建议：建立科学的高管学习机制及过度自信预警指标；公司不同发展阶段采用不同的股利监控政策；避免“一股独大”现象，采用股权制衡的结构模式；健全和完善我国上市公司的独立董事制度。
[Abstract]:There are overconfident executives in listed companies in our country. Their irrational cash dividend decisions not only harm the interests of investors or shareholders, but also hinder the development of the company. On the basis of regression and combing of domestic and foreign research literature, this paper abandons the hypothesis of rational manager in classical financial theory, and tries to make use of Shanghai, China. The financial data released by A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shenzhen in 2010-2012 are guided by the related theories of behavioral finance. This paper empirically tests the relationship between the psychological factor of executive overconfidence and corporate cash dividend distribution policy, and the influence of corporate growth and equity structure on the above relationship. The measurement of overconfidence has not yet formed a unified standard is a major bottleneck restricting the development of the theory, this paper combines normative research with empirical research. In the third chapter, through deductive reasoning, the feasibility and rationality of using the deviation degree of annual earnings forecast as a continuous substitute variable of executive overconfidence are preliminarily demonstrated. Then through the construction of appropriate mathematical model to analyze the influence mechanism of executives' overconfident psychological preference on cash dividend decision. On this basis, it puts forward three core propositions that are worthy of further discussion. The empirical part of Chapter 4th selects A-share listed companies which issued profit forecast in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2012 as the research samples. On the basis of controlling the series of characteristic variables of the company, this paper uses the multiple regression model to explore the influence of the psychological preference of the high management overconfidence on the behavior of cash dividend distribution in the listed companies of our country. The results show that overconfident managers tend to pay less cash dividends to enhance internal financing; And when the company has higher growth opportunities, its tendency to reduce the level of cash dividend distribution will be more obvious, that is, the growth of the company strengthened the corporate executives overconfidence on the impact of cash dividend distribution decisions; But balanced equity distribution can to some extent avoid the irrational behavior of reducing cash dividend due to executive overconfidence. According to the conclusions of empirical research. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions to help the listed companies overcome the adverse effects of overconfidence: establishing a scientific learning mechanism for senior executives and early warning indicators of overconfidence; The company adopts different dividend monitoring policies at different stages of development; To avoid the phenomenon of "one share dominating" and adopt the structural mode of equity balance; Improve and perfect the system of independent directors of listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【参考文献】