股票期权激励、高管解雇压力与公司风险承担

发布时间：2017-12-31 16:23

本文关键词：股票期权激励、高管解雇压力与公司风险承担　出处：《经济与管理研究》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文融合经典代理理论和行为代理理论两种理论观点,依据激励条件和行权有效期,将高管股票期权激励区分为严苛型和宽松型两类,分别研究其激励程度与公司风险承担水平之间的关系,并考察高管解雇压力对此二者关系的影响。研究结果表明:(1)严苛型高管股票期权激励程度与公司风险承担水平呈显著非线性关系,宽松型高管股票期权激励程度与公司风险承担水平呈显著线性负相关关系;(2)解雇压力滞后了严苛型高管股票期权激励程度与公司风险承担水平之间的非线性关系,并减弱了宽松型高管股票期激励程度与公司风险承担水平之间的负相关关系。
[Abstract]:In this paper, combining the classic agency theory and behavior theory of agency two theories, on the basis of incentive conditions and the exercise period, the executive stock option incentive is divided into severe type and loose type two categories, respectively, to study the relationship between the incentive degree and firm risk level, and test the effect of observing the relationship between the two executives dismissed this pressure. The results show that: (1) severe type of executive stock option incentive and corporate risk-taking level showed a significant nonlinear relationship, loose type of executive stock option incentive and corporate risk-taking level showed a significant linear negative correlation; (2) fire pressure hysteresis nonlinear relationship between the level of risk taking harsh type of executive stock option incentive degree and the company, and weaken the negative relationship between executive stock incentive period loose and firm risk level.

【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“面向价值目标导引的企业战略决策方法研究”(71271048) 教育部博士学科点专项基金(博导类)项目“长期报酬、非货币效用及动态基础薪酬的激励效应研究:基于相对价值创造视角”(20130042110032) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“在职消费经济性质、作用机理及经济后果研究”(16YJA630048)
【分类号】：F272.3;F272.91;F724.5
【正文快照】： 一、问题提出股票期权是激励高管的重要手段,不同于西方国家的传统型股票期权大都采用股价作为高管行权的依据,国内公司普遍采用公司业绩作为高管行权的依据,即国内公司实施的股票期权激励计划为业绩型股票期权,但关于这些业绩条件等行权条款的设置对高管进行股票期权激励时

【相似文献】