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上市公司盈余管理与投资效率的相关性研究

发布时间:2018-01-07 15:35

  本文关键词:上市公司盈余管理与投资效率的相关性研究 出处:《山东财经大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 盈余管理 信息不对称 投资不足 过度投资 投资效率


【摘要】:自20世纪80年代开始,西方财务会计理论界致力于盈余管理的研究,盈余管理成为西方国家尤其是美国实证会计研究的重点之一。在我国,盈余管理是随着股份有限公司股票上市而出现的新问题。迄今为止,国内外学者已经围绕盈余管理的动因、手段和经济后果等进行了广泛的分析和检验。 就盈余管理的经济后果而言,传统研究主要集中于盈余管理对企业契约以及对投资者、债权人等外部利益相关者的影响,只有少量文献涉及盈余管理对企业内部决策的影响。如Bar Gill和Bebchuk(2002)认为,由于公司可以通过虚夸业绩获取低成本的资金,所以盈余管理的公司更容易实施无效的投资项目。Wang(2005)的研究认为,财务舞弊公司为了降低被揭露的风险,更倾向投资于高风险高收益项目,并存在过度投资的现象。 本文从投资效率的视角研究了上市公司在我国社会背景下盈余管理的经济后果,采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法,对2011-2012年深沪两市上市公司的所有A股进行实证研究。研究结果表明:盈余管理行为会降低企业的投资效率。在此基础上,本文又将盈余管理分为正向盈余管理和负向盈余管理两组数据,随后,将这两组数据分别与投资效率进行回归分析,,结果显示:负向盈余管理与投资不足正相关,而正向盈余管理与投资不足的回归结果不显著,这说明负向盈余管理的企业更可能出现投资不足的情况;负向盈余管理与投资过度、正向盈余管理与投资过度均出现正相关,这说明负向盈余管理的企业也可能会出现投资过度的现象,原因是企业进行负向盈余管理一般都是采用平滑利润或使利润最小化等手段,其目的是使利润发生较大变化,但不改变企业本身的现金流及投资能力;存在正向盈余管理行为的企业更可能过度投资。本文由此得出结论:盈余管理不仅影响外部投资者对其进行的投资决策,也会影响本单位的投资效率,损害市场资源的有效配置。因此,必须采用有效措施抑制公司的盈余管理行为。
[Abstract]:Since 1980s, the western financial accounting theorists have devoted themselves to the study of earnings management, and earnings management has become one of the focuses of empirical accounting research in western countries, especially in the United States. Earnings management is a new problem in the stock market of limited stock companies. So far, scholars at home and abroad have carried out extensive analysis and testing on the causes, means and economic consequences of earnings management. As far as the economic consequences of earnings management are concerned, the traditional research focuses on the impact of earnings management on corporate contracts and external stakeholders such as investors and creditors. There is only a small amount of literature on the impact of earnings management on internal corporate decisions, such as Bar Gill and Bebchukn 2002, which argue that companies can obtain low-cost funds by boasting about their performance. Therefore, earnings management companies are more likely to implement ineffective investment projects. Wangyn 2005) the study that financial fraud companies in order to reduce the exposure of risk, more inclined to invest in high risk and high return projects. And there is an overinvestment phenomenon. From the perspective of investment efficiency, this paper studies the economic consequences of earnings management of listed companies under the social background of our country, and adopts the method of combining theoretical analysis and empirical test. The empirical study on all A-shares of listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2011-2012. The results show that earnings management behavior will reduce the investment efficiency of enterprises. On this basis. In this paper, earnings management is divided into positive earnings management and negative earnings management two groups of data, and then the two groups of data and investment efficiency regression analysis. The results show that the negative earnings management is positively related to the insufficient investment, but the regression result between the positive earnings management and the insufficient investment is not significant, which indicates that the enterprises with the negative earnings management are more likely to underinvest; Negative earnings management and excessive investment, positive earnings management and investment excessive appear positive correlation, which shows that negative earnings management enterprises may also have the phenomenon of excessive investment. The reason is that the negative earnings management is usually carried out by means of smoothing profits or minimizing profits, the purpose of which is to make the profits change greatly, but not to change the cash flow and investment ability of the enterprises themselves. Enterprises with positive earnings management behavior are more likely to overinvest. This paper concludes that earnings management not only affects the investment decisions of external investors, but also affects the investment efficiency of the unit. Therefore, effective measures must be taken to restrain the earnings management behavior of companies.
【学位授予单位】:山东财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F275;F832.51

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