定价基准日选择、市场择时与定向增发中的大股东利益输送

发布时间：2018-01-08 08:08

本文关键词：定价基准日选择、市场择时与定向增发中的大股东利益输送　出处：《经济管理》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：为弱化定向增发中的大股东利益输送行为,证监会于2017年2月15日出台规定,定向增发的定价基准日为非公开发行股票的发行期首日。本文以此为背景,对2015—2016年我国上市公司定向增发的样本进行研究。结果表明,虽然与董事会决议公告日相比,以发行期首日为定价基准日的增发折价率显著较低,但理论和实证结果都证明,以发行期首日为定价基准日时,大股东仍有低价认购的机会主义动机,并且停牌操控和市场择时等利益输送手段依旧能够帮助其实现低价认购的目的,控制了自选择的内生性后甚至负面影响更大。故对停牌时间长度的限制有利于削弱大股东通过停牌操控进行利益输送的途径,但对大股东的基准日择时行为作用有限。为促进定向增发市场的市场化定价,本文提出了若干有针对性的建议。
[Abstract]:Transport behavior weakening the interests of major shareholders in the private placement, the Commission issued regulations in February 15, 2017, the private placement pricing benchmark for non-public offering of shares on the first day of issue. In this paper, the study on the 2015 2016 private placement of Listed Companies in China samples. The results show that although the announcement board resolution compared to the first day of issue for the discount rate on the issuance of the pricing benchmark is significantly lower, but the theoretical and empirical results show that in the first day of issue for the pricing benchmark, large shareholders still have low-cost opportunities for the doctrine of motivation, and suspension control and market timing and other means of transfer of benefits can still help to achieve the subscription price to control the endogenous self selection of even greater negative impact. It can weaken the big shareholders through manipulation of the length of the suspension suspension time limit The way of profit transmission is limited, but it plays a limited role in large shareholder's benchmark day timing behavior. In order to promote the market-oriented pricing of private placement market, this paper puts forward some specific suggestions.

【作者单位】：上海财经大学金融学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“‘拉动-推动’框架下跨境资本异常流动的识别、预警和监管研究”(71273163)
【分类号】：F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言我国定向增发市场起步相对较晚,2006年证监会才出台相应的增发规则,即《上市公司证券发行管理办法》(证监会令第30号,以下简称“管理办法”)。该“管理办法”规定“非公开发行股票的发行价格不低于定价基准日前二十个交易日公司股票均价的百分之九十”,被业内俗称为“

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