股权激励、代理成本与公司业绩——基于两种代理成本的中介效应检验

发布时间：2018-01-11 15:19

本文关键词：股权激励、代理成本与公司业绩——基于两种代理成本的中介效应检验　出处：《湖湘论坛》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：委托代理关系中,股东与管理层的代理冲突来源于两部分,一部分是由管理层道德风险行为引发的对公司价值和股东利益的直接侵害,另一部分是管理层因风险规避而投资不足造成的产出缺口,文中将之分别定义为"显性代理成本"和"隐性代理成本"。而以利益共享、风险共担为设计初衷,旨在统一股东与管理层目标函数的股权激励,一方面通过提高管理层为道德风险行为承担的私人成本,另一方面通过增加管理层投资决策的私人收益,理论上有助于缓解代理冲突。对2006-2015年沪深A股上市公司的实证检验证实,股权激励显著降低了显性代理成本和隐性代理成本。进一步地,中介效应检验结果表明:这两种代理成本在股权激励与公司业绩的关系中发挥了部分中介作用,股权激励以显性代理成本和隐性代理成本为路径,间接提高了公司业绩。
[Abstract]:In the principal-agent relationship, the agency conflict between shareholders and management comes from two parts, one is the direct infringement on the company value and shareholders' interests caused by the moral hazard behavior of the management. The other part is the output gap caused by the underinvestment of management due to risk aversion, which is defined as "explicit agency cost" and "implicit agency cost" respectively. The aim of equity incentive is to unify the objective function of shareholders and management, on the one hand, by increasing the private cost of moral hazard behavior, on the other hand, by increasing the private income of management's investment decision. The empirical test of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2015 proves that equity incentive significantly reduces the explicit agency cost and implicit agency cost. The results of intermediary effect test show that these two kinds of agency costs play a part of intermediary role in the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, and the path of equity incentive is explicit agency cost and implicit agency cost. Indirectly improved the company's performance.
【作者单位】：四川大学;
【基金】：四川省哲学社会科学规划重大招标项目“四川省创新驱动发展战略的产业实现与政策研究”(项目编号:SC13ZD05)
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言传统委托代理视角下,股东与管理层(1)因为目标利益函数的差异而产生代理冲突,表现为管理层往往凭借对企业较大的控制权进行掏空公司、侵犯股东权益等一系列行为,造成公司的营业外支出,是公司价值及股东利益的显性损失(李寿喜,2007)。[1]而在股东与管理层的委托代理关

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