风险投资对IPO盈余管理影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-14 11:16

本文关键词：风险投资对IPO盈余管理影响的实证研究　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2004年中小企业板和2009年创业板的推出，降低了中小企业的上市门槛，为其提供了更加广阔的融资平台。同时，这也使得风险投资具备了更加宽松的退出渠道，使得越来越多的风险投资机构通过帮助这些中小企业进行首次公开募股（IPO）从而成功退出并获得风险资本的增值。但是，为了达到上市标准或筹集更多资金，我国很多首次公开发行上市的公司都存在盈余管理行为。针对这种现象，作为投资者的风险投资机构在被投企业IPO过程中可能会起到认证作用或者监督作用，从而抑制IPO公司管理层的盈余管理行为，但它也可能会起到躁动作用，纵容甚至帮助被投企业进行IPO盈余管理。因此，本文将2004年6月至2012年12月间在中小企业板上市的公司以及2009年10月 2012年12月间在创业板上市的公司作为研究样本，运用实证研究的方法，检验有风险投资支持的公司是否比无风险投资支持的公司盈余管理程度更低，以及高声誉风险投资是否比低声誉风险投资更能抑制IPO公司的盈余管理行为。本文的研究结果显示，对在我国中小企业板和创业板上市的公司来说，风险投资的参与确实能在一定程度上减轻上市公司的IPO盈余管理行为。但是，与国外的研究结果相比，我国风险投资的这种认证作用和监督作用并没有那么强。另外，研究结果还表明，高声誉的风险投资机构确实比低声誉的风险投资机构更能抑制IPO公司的盈余管理行为，但是这种差异并不是很明显。最后，针对这些研究结论，，本文提出了一些启示与建议，旨在加强防范拟上市公司的IPO盈余管理行。另外，本文还提出了发展我国风险投资业的一些建议。
[Abstract]:The launch of the SME Board in 2004 and the gem in 2009 lowered the listing threshold of SMEs and provided them with a broader financing platform. At the same time. This also gives venture capital a more relaxed exit channel. Make more and more venture capital institutions by helping these small and medium-sized enterprises to carry out initial public offering (IPO) so as to successfully exit and gain the value of venture capital. However. In order to meet the listing standards or raise more funds, many companies listed on the IPO in China have earnings management behavior. As an investor, the venture capital institution may play a role of certification or supervision in the IPO process of the invested enterprise, thereby restraining the earnings management behavior of the management of IPO company. But it can also play a restless role, conniving or even helping invested companies manage IPO earnings. So... This paper takes the companies listed on the SME Board from June 2004 to December 2012 and the companies listed on the gem from October 2009 to October 2009 as the research samples. The empirical study is used to test whether the companies with venture capital support have lower degree of earnings management than those without venture capital support. And whether high reputation venture capital can restrain earnings management behavior of IPO more than low reputation risk investment. The results of this paper show that the participation of venture capital can alleviate the IPO earnings management behavior of listed companies to some extent. Compared with the foreign research results, the role of the certification and supervision of venture capital in China is not so strong. In addition, the results also show that. It is true that high reputation venture capital firms can restrain earnings management behavior of IPO more than low reputation venture capital firms, but the difference is not obvious. Finally, in view of these research conclusions, this paper puts forward some enlightenment and suggestions, in order to strengthen the prevention of listed companies' IPO earnings management. In addition. This paper also puts forward some suggestions for the development of venture capital industry in China.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【引证文献】