我国上市公司高管薪酬粘性的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-16 14:09

本文关键词：我国上市公司高管薪酬粘性的实证研究　出处：《吉林大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来高管薪酬一直是人们热议的话题，也是理论界研究的焦点。高管薪酬作为解决企业内委托代理问题的一种手段，其存在的根本目的在于激励管理层为股东工作，通过企业价值增值最终实现股东利益的最大化。随着越来越多的上市公司选择业绩型报酬作为公司高层管理人员的报酬形式，我国上市公司高管薪酬机制逐步趋向合理。然而社会关注的焦点永远是高管薪酬是否过高。2008年经济危机爆发，股市震荡，公众对上市公司的信任越发脆弱，而各种“天价薪酬”的曝光无疑是火上浇油。通过统计2007-2011年我国上市公司高管薪酬总额发现，，高管薪酬在总额上一直呈现增长趋势，且增幅明显。但高管薪酬机制理应与激励机制同时作用，作为惩罚的约束机制却并没有良好的体现在我国上市公司数据上，2007年-2011年五年间高管薪酬下降的上市公司仅有1793家，占全部统计样本的26.33%。高管的薪酬到底如何变化值得我们做进一步的研究。国内外学者对于高管薪酬的研究经过较长时间的积累，已经不断验证了相关理论推断的结果，而研究的内容也不断变化。早期的研究多偏重于高管薪酬制定影响因素，并且往往以单一年度上市公司数据作为研究样本，这时的研究多得出结论认为我国上市公司的高管薪酬偏低且并没有起到预期的激励作用。随着我国资本市场逐年完善，可用来研究的样本数据也更加完整，学者的研究开始转向以三至五年的上市公司数据作为样本，并在研究影响高管薪酬因素时范围更广，思考的角度也更繁复。这部分学者的研究发现我国上市公司高管薪酬不仅受业绩，还受到公司规模、财务杠杆、公司成长性、独立董事等许多其他因素的影响。近年来，已经有学者开始关注高管薪酬变化的特征，国外已有学者对高管薪酬粘性进行系统的研究，国内也有少数学者提出了高管薪酬粘性的概念，但对于我国上市公司高管薪酬是否存在粘性的实证研究却寥寥可数。本文欲在研究公司业绩对高管薪酬影响的基础上，对高管薪酬是否存在粘性进行探索。选取沪深两市2007年-2011年五个会计年度披露相关数据的公司作为研究样本，构建模型，通过结合使用描述性统计分析与回归分析的方法，首先验证高管薪酬受到公司业绩的影响，其次研究公司业绩对高管薪酬的反作用，最后在此基础上引入薪酬差值作为因变量，业绩差值作为自变量，探讨两者之间的关系。根据实证分析得出结论：我国上市公司高管薪酬受公司业绩的影响，并且高管薪酬对公司业绩具有正向的激励作用，高管薪酬的变化在公司业绩上升和下降两种不同情况下所表现出的上升和下降的幅度不同，当公司业绩上升时高管薪酬的增加值要大于公司业绩下降时的减少值，即高管薪酬的变化在公司业绩变化时表现出不对称性，高管薪酬存在粘性。
[Abstract]:In recent years, executive compensation has been a hot topic, but also the focus of theoretical research. Executive compensation as a means to solve the problem of principal-agent in enterprises. The fundamental purpose of its existence is to encourage management to work for shareholders. As more and more listed companies choose performance-based compensation as the form of compensation for the top management of the company. However, the focus of social attention is always whether the executive compensation is too high. In 2008, the economic crisis broke out, and the stock market fluctuated. The public trust in listed companies is becoming more and more fragile, and the exposure of various "sky-high compensation" is undoubtedly adding fuel to the fire. Executive compensation has been showing a trend of growth in the total amount, and the increase is obvious. But the executive compensation mechanism should work with the incentive mechanism at the same time. As a punishment of the constraint mechanism is not well reflected in the data of listed companies in China, from 2007 to 2011 five years of decline in executive compensation of listed companies only 1 793. 26.33% of the total statistical sample. How the executive compensation changes are worthy of further study. Domestic and foreign scholars for executive compensation research after a long period of accumulation, has constantly verified the results of relevant theoretical inference. The content of the study is also constantly changing. The early studies focus on the executive pay development factors, and often take a single annual listed company data as the research sample. At this time, most of the research concluded that the executive compensation of listed companies in China is on the low side and does not play the role of incentive. As the capital market in China has been improved year by year, the sample data that can be used to study is more complete. Scholars' research began to shift to three to five years of listed company data as a sample, and in the study of executive compensation factors more widely. The perspective of thinking is more complex. This part of the scholars found that the executive compensation of listed companies in China not only by performance, but also by the size of the company, financial leverage, corporate growth. In recent years, some scholars have begun to pay attention to the characteristics of executive compensation changes, foreign scholars have carried out a systematic study of executive pay stickiness. There are a few domestic scholars put forward the concept of executive pay stickiness, but there are few empirical studies on whether there is stickiness in executive compensation of listed companies in China. This paper intends to study the impact of corporate performance on executive compensation on the basis of. To explore whether there is stickiness of executive compensation. Select the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2011 to disclose the relevant data of five fiscal years as a research sample to build a model. Through the use of descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis, the paper first verifies that executive compensation is affected by company performance, and then studies the counteraction of company performance on executive compensation. Finally, the paper introduces the compensation margin as dependent variable and the performance difference as independent variable to discuss the relationship between them. According to the empirical analysis, we can conclude that the executive compensation of listed companies in China is affected by the performance of the company, and the executive compensation has a positive incentive to the performance of the company. The change of executive compensation in the company performance rise and fall in two different cases show the rise and fall of the range of different. When the company's performance is rising, the added value of executive compensation is larger than the decrease of the company's performance, that is, the change of executive compensation shows asymmetry when the company's performance changes, and the executive compensation has stickiness.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.6;F224

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