产品异质条件下排污权交易市场支配力的影响及其防范机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-16 19:29

本文关键词：产品异质条件下排污权交易市场支配力的影响及其防范机制研究　出处：《江苏大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：日趋臻显的外向型、开放型经济发展特点和行业细分趋势等因素在很大程度上决定了我国区域排污权交易系统内不存在显著的产品竞争。现有的理论与实践表明,排污权交易体系中同样存在市场支配力,并导致市场机制扭曲,进而损害其实施的有效性及效果。因此,在市场经济体制尚不完善的基本国情下,要实现向排污权交易这一新型环境管理体制的顺利转型,亟需对其予以充分关注。鉴于此,在产品异质条件下,通过考虑产成品市场与排污权交易市场之间的关联影响,综合运用非线性规划、博弈论等方法,在分析社会最优的排污权配置状态的基础上构建了主导企业与从属企业之间的主从博弈模型,通过分析特定排污权市场价格下从属企业的最优行为特征,深入剖析了主导企业的策略性行为及其对系统均衡的影响。进而,以实现社会最优化配置方案为基准,从排污权初始分配和矫正性税收的视角分别探讨市场支配的防范措施。基于数理分析结论并针对其不足,采用量化分析方法对结论进行了验证性分析。具体而言:首先,针对排污权交易中存在的市场支配力问题进行分析,深入挖掘主导企业运用市场支配力进行价格操纵的证据,对比市场支配力状态下的系统均衡较社会最优化配置状态的偏离。主要结论表明:在社会最优配置方案下,企业使用单位排污权的边际收益及单位污染削减的边际成本都应与排污权价格相一致;为了获取更大的额外收益,主导企业存在作为卖家时选择“溢价”与作为买家时“抑价”两种排污权价格操纵形式,并不可避免地导致系统均衡与社会最优配置状态的偏离,而从属企业却会蒙受更巨大的损失;初始排污权禀赋是影响主导企业最优决策的重要因素。其次,在深入分析市场支配力对排污权交易系统均衡影响的基础上,本文尝试从排污权初始分配的视角出发,实现对市场支配力的事前控制。结果显示:在现有的分配机制下,针对第1分配周期可能存在的市场支配力问题,政府部门对主导企业和从属企业第2分配周期初始禀赋量进行调节,促进减排任务的再分配,倒逼主导企业在第1分配周期的理性决策是不进行排污权交易价格操纵,进而实现系统效率的最优。最终,考虑到市场支配力对系统均衡的影响具有多样性与复杂性,以及排污权自身复杂性、市场不确定性、信息不对称等因素广泛存在使得合理的排污权初始分配机制面临诸多困境,特别是在排污权交易过程中出现市场支配力问题的防范显得尤为乏力。因此,对市场支配力的防范由事前控制转为事中控制显得尤为重要。排污权交易税作为政府管制的一种工具,对排污权交易系统同样具有扭曲作用,本文进一步尝试并将其纳入企业的生产、削减、交易等环节的决策深入探讨排污权交易市场支配力的防范机制。结果显示,精心设计的矫正性税收机制能有效地抑制主导企业的策略性行为,成为市场支配力防范的有力工具。本文的研究对揭示与解释排污权交易系统中的市场支配力问题等具有重要的理论意义和学术价值,可为相关政策决策提供理论依据,有效防范机制的提出为实现排污权交易机制的合理选取与创设,降低实施的盲目性与不确定性,为其实施的持续性和可接受性提供参考。
[Abstract]:Has attained significant export-oriented, open economy characteristics and subdivision of industry trends and other factors to a great extent determine that there is no significant product competition in China's regional emissions trading system. Theory and practice show that the market power has the same emission trading system, and lead to the distortion of the market mechanism, and damage to the effectiveness of their implementation and effect. Therefore, the basic conditions of the market economy system is not perfect, to achieve a smooth transition to the emission trading is a new environmental management system, to give full attention to it. In view of this, in the condition of product heterogeneity, by considering the correlation effect between product and market the emissions trading market, the integrated use of nonlinear programming, game theory and other methods, based on the status of emission rights allocation between social analysis on the optimal construction of leading enterprises and subordinate enterprises The game model, through the analysis of the optimal behavior of subordinate enterprise specific emission rights market price, in-depth analysis of the strategic behavior of dominant enterprises and its influence on the system equilibrium. Then, in order to achieve the social optimum allocation scheme for reference, discuss market control and preventive measures from the initial allocation of emission rights and corrective tax from the perspective of mathematical analysis and conclusion. Aiming at the lack of quantitative analysis methods based on the conclusions are verified. Firstly, this paper analyzes the existing emissions trading market power issues, in-depth excavation of leading enterprises using market power for evidence of price fixing system deviates from the equilibrium state comparison of market power under the optimal configuration compared to the social state. The main results show that the optimal allocation in the society, enterprises use unit emission right side When the marginal cost of revenue and unit pollution reduction should be consistent with the emission right price; in order to obtain additional income more, leading enterprises as the seller's choice of "premium" and "underpricing" as buyers of two kinds of emission right price manipulation, and inevitably lead to deviation from the equilibrium and the social optimum allocation system state, and subordinate enterprises will suffer more huge losses; initial emission rights endowment is an important factor influencing the leading enterprises optimal decision. Secondly, based on the in-depth analysis of market dominance effects on emissions trading system equilibrium, this paper attempts to start from the initial allocation of emission rights from the perspective of the beforehand control of the market the dominant force. The results showed that: in the existing allocation mechanism, aiming at the first distribution cycle may have market power, government departments of leading enterprise and subordinate enterprise distribution second The amount of initial endowment cycle adjustment, promote the redistribution of emission reduction task, forced the leading enterprises in the rational decision first distribution period is not emissions trading price manipulation, so as to realize the optimal efficiency of the system. Finally, considering the market power has the diversity and complexity of system equilibrium, and the complexity of emission rights, market uncertainty, information asymmetry and other factors exist makes the initial allocation of emission rights reasonable mechanism are facing many difficulties, especially to prevent power market problems in the process of emissions trading is very weak. Therefore, to prevent market power by the beforehand control of things into control is very important. A tool emissions trading tax as the government regulation, also have a distorting effect on the emission trading system, this paper attempts to further and bring it into the enterprise life Cut, production, trade and other links making in-depth study of prevention mechanism of emissions trading market power. The results show that carefully designed corrective tax mechanism can effectively restrain the dominant strategy of enterprises, has become a powerful tool to prevent market power. This research has important theoretical significance and academic value of reveal and explain the emission trading system in the market power issues, provide a theoretical basis for the policy decision, put forward effective prevention mechanism for rational selection and creation to achieve emissions trading mechanism, reduce the blindness of the implementation and uncertainty, persistent and acceptable to provide reference for its implementation.

【学位授予单位】：江苏大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X196;F832.5

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