“追名”还是“逐利”:独立董事履职动机之探究

发布时间：2018-01-17 16:14

本文关键词：“追名”还是“逐利”:独立董事履职动机之探究　出处：《管理科学》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：经营权与控制权分离引发的代理问题是催生独立董事这一群体的制度根源。引入独立董事制度,维护公司整体利益,尤其是关注中小股东的合法权益不受损害,是监管机构改善公司治理结构的重要举措。独立董事在本质上也是剩余索取者的代理人,与股东之间同样存在代理问题。如何构建独立董事激励机制,使其与中小股东建立有效受托责任关系,是监管部门和实务界面临的一大难题。以2002年至2015年沪、深两市A股主板上市公司为样本,使用手工配对法、Logit回归和OLS回归,采用进一步分析和一系列稳健性检验,从个人特征、公司特征和制度环境3个层面考察零薪酬独立董事的影响因素,并从"追名"和"逐利"两个角度对独立董事履职动机进行探讨。研究结果表明,从个人特征看,零薪酬更可能出现在独立性较强的董事中;从公司特征看,零薪酬更可能出现在违规风险较低的公司;从制度环境看,零薪酬更可能出现在市场化程度较高的地区。零薪酬独立董事在出席董事会时也更加勤勉,以上结论与"追名"动机逻辑一致。进一步研究发现,会计背景的零薪酬独立董事能进一步甄别出财务风险更高的公司;由于存在自选择,零薪酬独立董事任职公司的治理水平更高,其并未出具更多的否定意见。研究结果说明经济和声誉两种激励方式在不同独立董事个体间发挥的作用差异较大。一方面,为独立董事零薪酬现象提供了合理解释,说明上市公司应当根据自身所处的制度环境、风险水平以及每位独立董事的具体特征等设定差异化的薪酬水平;另一方面,也对监管部门完善独立董事激励机制、培育独立董事人才市场具有现实的指导意义。
[Abstract]:The agency problem caused by the separation of management right and control right is the institutional root of the group of independent directors. The introduction of independent director system to protect the overall interests of the company, especially concern about the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders will not be damaged. Independent directors are essentially agents of residual claimants, and there are also agency problems between shareholders and independent directors. How to construct the incentive mechanism of independent directors. To establish an effective fiduciary responsibility relationship with small and medium shareholders is a big problem faced by regulators and practitioners. From 2002 to 2015, Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share main Board listed companies as a sample. Manual paired logit regression and OLS regression were used for further analysis and a series of robust tests from individual characteristics. This paper examines the influencing factors of independent directors with zero pay from three aspects of corporate characteristics and institutional environment, and discusses the motivation of independent directors from the perspectives of "chasing fame" and "chasing profits". The research results show that the independent directors are motivated to carry out their duties. From the point of view of individual characteristics, zero pay is more likely to appear in the directors with strong independence; From the company characteristics, zero pay is more likely to appear in the company with low risk of violation; From the perspective of institutional environment, zero pay is more likely to appear in areas with a higher degree of marketization, and independent directors with zero pay are also more diligent in attending the board of directors. The above conclusions are consistent with the motivation logic of "chasing fame". Further study shows that independent directors with zero pay background can further identify the companies with higher financial risk; Because of the existence of self-selection, the governance level of the independent directors with zero remuneration is higher. It does not issue more negative opinion. The research results show that the economic and reputation incentives play different roles among different independent directors. On the one hand. It provides a reasonable explanation for the phenomenon of zero compensation of independent directors, and explains that listed companies should set different compensation levels according to their own institutional environment, risk level and the specific characteristics of each independent director. On the other hand, it has practical guiding significance for the supervision department to perfect the incentive mechanism of independent director and to cultivate the market of independent director talents.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学会计学院;中国人民银行常州市中心支行;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71602191)~~
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 引言独立董事制度的出现,源于早期公司治理措施的失败,特别是董事会职能的失效。建立独立董事制度的初衷是在股权高度分散的情况下可以让独立董事代表全体股东对上市公司的经理人进行监督,以减少因为经理人的机会主义行为导致的代理问题[1]。本质上讲,独立董事也是剩余索取

【相似文献】