管理层权力、自由现金流量与过度并购——基于沪深上市公司并购数据的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-19 06:12

本文关键词： 管理层权力自由现金流量过度并购过度投资　出处：《宏观经济研究》2017年09期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：并购作为投资的一种主要方式,是资本市场的重点研究问题。本文以2013年内发生并完成并购的上市公司为研究样本,讨论管理层权力、自由现金流量和过度并购的关系。实证研究结果显示,自由现金流量在管理层权力影响过度并购的过程中起部分中介作用,即当管理层权力较大时,管理层的私利动机更容易通过支配自由现金流量来实现,利用大量的自由现金流量进行非理性的过度并购投资,为实现管理层私利打下基础。基于此,本文建议:上市公司治理过程中应加强盈余管理,重要股东应在管理层控制情形下加强对管理层投资行为的监督,上市公司治理中可通过改进管理层激励机制降低管理层私利预期。
[Abstract]:M & A, as a main way of investment, is the focus of capital market research. This paper discusses the power of management based on the listed companies that took place and completed mergers and acquisitions in 2013. Empirical results show that free cash flow plays an intermediary role in the process of management power influencing excessive M & A, that is, when the management has more power. The motivation of self-interest of management is more easily realized by controlling free cash flow, making use of a large amount of free cash flow to carry out irrational excessive M & A investment, which lays the foundation for realizing management's self-interest. This paper suggests that earnings management should be strengthened in the process of listed company governance, and that important shareholders should strengthen the supervision of management's investment behavior under the control of management. In the governance of listed companies, the self-interest expectation of management can be reduced by improving the incentive mechanism of management.
【作者单位】：东北财经大学工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 马金城张力丹罗巧艳引言并购是投资的一种主要方式,也是管理层在进行过度投资时倾向于选择的工具。为了进一步解释代理成本,Jensen(1986)首次提出了自由现金流量假说,发现管理者更倾向于将企业的资源运用到最有利于自身利益而实现公司价值最大化的项目上,公司拥有的自由现金流

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