超募资金与高管薪酬契约

发布时间：2018-01-30 13:48

本文关键词： 超募资金高管薪酬产品市场竞争大股东两权分离　出处：《会计研究》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章探讨首次公开发行超募资金对上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究发现,总体而言,当超募资金用于补充流动资金的程度增加时,上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著降低,薪酬粘性显著提高。表明超募资金补充公司流动性的行为增加了公司代理成本,降低了高管薪酬契约有效性,弱化了高管激励。进一步研究显示,超募资金补充流动性对薪酬契约的不利影响在低竞争行业的公司中表现的更为显著;大股东两权分离会加剧超募资金补充流动性对高管薪酬契约的负面影响。募集资金的有效使用依赖于相关治理机制的建设。文章的结论丰富了IPO募集资金使用效率方面的文献,对于政策制定者具有重要的参考价值。
[Abstract]:This paper discusses the effect of initial public offering excess funds on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts in listed companies. The study finds that, in general, when excess funds are used to replenish liquidity, the extent is increased. The performance sensitivity of executive compensation in listed companies is significantly reduced, and the viscosity of compensation is significantly increased, which indicates that the behavior of over-raising funds to replenish corporate liquidity increases the agency cost of the company and reduces the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts. Further research shows that the negative effect of excess capital replenishment liquidity on salary contract is more significant in companies in low-competitive industries; The separation of the two rights of large shareholders will aggravate the negative impact of excess capital replenishment on executive compensation contracts. The effective use of raised funds depends on the construction of relevant governance mechanisms. The conclusion of this paper enriches the IPO fundraising mechanism. Using literature on efficiency. It has important reference value for policy makers.
【作者单位】：北京工商大学商学院/国有资产管理协同创新中心;财政部会计资格评价中心;
【基金】：北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心项目(GZ20131002) 北京工商大学青年教师科研启动基金(QNJJ2015-07)的资助国家自然科学基金项目(71502007和71672003) 北京市社会科学基金重点课题(14JGA011)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言资本市场的核心功能是满足公司融资需求,促进社会资源的合理优化配置。企业通过首次公开发行(IPO)获得大量社会闲置资金,为满足自身经营和发展壮大提供了资金支持。募集资金的使用效率在一定程度上反映了公司的运营管理能力,是衡量资本市场资源配置效率的一个重要方

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