公司治理机制对现金股利与过度投资关系影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-09 23:03

本文关键词： 公司治理机制自由现金流现金股利过度投资　出处：《郑州大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现金股利发放能否对过度投资行为产生抑制作用备受学者关注,而公司治理机制对两者关系的影响却不尽明了。伴随着学者们从不同角度对过度投资行为的关注,其带来的负面影响逐渐受到企业的重视,作为一种非有效投资方式,其能够直接导致企业现金流的滥用以及价值降低,进而也严重影响公司未来融资与分配决策。在第五届金融街论坛上,吴敬琏指出过度投资已造成负面作用,投资回报递减的规律充分显现,且蕴藏系统风险。我国上市公司普遍存在过度投资行为。在已有研究的基础上,考察现金股利发放对过度投资行为的影响;通过主成分分析方法测量公司治理机制水平,衡量其对现金股利—过度投资关系的调节效应;进一步通过分组分析,实证检验民营与国有上市公司在抑制效果方面的异质性;通过影响机制分析,研究现金股利抑制作用能够发挥所经过的路径。实证研究主要得出三个结论:第一,现金股利对缓解过度投资行为存在一定的抑制作用。现金股利的发放有利于减少上市公司过度投资行为,缓解管理者与所有者之间的代理冲突。第二,监督机制的完善能强化现金股利发放对过度投资行为的抑制作用,但从样本总体来看,激励机制的完善未能形成类似监督机制的强化作用。异质性检验结果显示,国有企业与民营企业样本组在上述作用的表现不一致。在国有企业样本组中,监督机制、激励机制都表现出对现金股利抑制过度投资关系的强化作用,而在民营企业样本组不存在这样的显著关系。第三,现金股利抑制过度投资的作用机制是通过影响企业自由现金流。发放现金股利导致自由现金流的减少,从而防止管理层滥用自由现金流进行过度投资。投资须有度,合理的投资结构才能使资金使用更高效。实证结果发现现金股利发放能够对过度投资行为产生一定抑制作用,这也就丰富了抑制过度投资行为的相关文献,而这种抑制作用在良好的国有企业公司治理机制中表现的更为明显,因此对国有企业而言,要想抑制现金流过度投资行为,发放现金股利是一种方式,而完善公司治理机制也同样有必要。
[Abstract]:Whether the cash dividend can inhibit excessive investment behavior has attracted much attention from scholars, but the influence of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between them is not clear. As a non-effective way of investment, it can directly lead to the abuse of cash flow and the reduction of value. At the 5th Financial Street Forum, Wu Jinglian pointed out that excessive investment has caused negative effects, and that the law of diminishing returns on investment is fully apparent. On the basis of existing research, the influence of cash dividend payment on over-investment behavior is investigated, and the level of corporate governance mechanism is measured by principal component analysis. To measure its regulatory effect on cash dividend-excessive investment relationship; to further test the heterogeneity of the inhibition effect between private and state-owned listed companies through grouping analysis; through the analysis of influence mechanism, The research on the inhibition of cash dividend can play a role in the path. The empirical study mainly draws three conclusions: first, Cash dividend has a certain inhibitory effect on the behavior of overinvestment. The issuance of cash dividend is helpful to reduce the overinvestment behavior of listed companies and ease the agency conflict between managers and owners. Second, The improvement of supervision mechanism can strengthen the restraining effect of cash dividend payment on excessive investment behavior, but from the sample overall, the improvement of incentive mechanism can not form the strengthening effect similar to that of supervision mechanism. The results of heterogeneity test show that, In the sample group of state-owned enterprises, supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism all show the strengthening effect on cash dividend restraining excessive investment relationship. But there is no such significant relationship in the sample group of private enterprises. Third, the mechanism of restraining overinvestment by cash dividend is to influence the free cash flow of enterprises. The distribution of cash dividend leads to the reduction of free cash flow. In order to prevent the management from overinvesting with free cash flow, the investment must be moderate, and the reasonable investment structure can make the use of funds more efficient. The empirical results show that the cash dividend distribution can restrain the overinvestment behavior to a certain extent. This also enriches the literature on the suppression of overinvestment, which is more evident in the good corporate governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, to the state-owned enterprises, if they want to curb the over-investment behavior of cash flow, Cash dividend is a way to improve corporate governance mechanism is also necessary.
【学位授予单位】：郑州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F271

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