中小板上市公司股权激励对盈余管理的影响

发布时间：2018-02-11 07:40

本文关键词： 中小板上市公司盈余管理股权激励　出处：《哈尔滨商业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2004年5月23日,我国中小企业板成立于深圳交易所,以新型的资本市场成员身份成为我国资本市场的重要的一部分。中小企业板上市公司实施股权激励可以使管理层的利益和公司的业绩有更紧密的联系,股权激励的实施一方面调动了管理层的积极性,但自身利益与公司业绩的紧密联系也会使管理层的盈余管理行为过度,对企业及股东造成损失。中小企业板上市公司为了长期稳定的发展,必须规范盈余管理行为。借鉴国内外专家学者对上市公司实施股权激励和其盈余管理程度的研究成果,并依托委托代理理论、人力资本理论、公司契约理论、激进理论等理论作为文章的理论基础。理论阐述股权激励对盈余管理影响的作用机理后,选取截止于2014年3月公开年报的272家中小企业板上市公司作为研究样本进行实证分析,检验分析股权激励对盈余管理的影响程度,提升中小企业板上市公司的股权激励实施与规范盈余管理的关注度,提出可行的建议来促进中小企业板上市公司健康的长期稳定发展。
[Abstract]:In May 23rd 2004, China's SME Board was established on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. As a new type of capital market member, it becomes an important part of China's capital market. On the one hand, the implementation of equity incentive motivates the enthusiasm of the management, but the close relationship between their own interests and the company's performance will also make the management's earnings management behavior excessive. In order to develop steadily for a long time, earnings management must be regulated. Draw lessons from domestic and foreign experts and scholars on the implementation of equity incentives and earnings management of listed companies, and rely on principal-agent theory, human capital theory, corporate contract theory, After explaining the mechanism of the effect of equity incentive on earnings management, 272 listed companies listed on the SME board as of March 2014 are selected as the empirical analysis sample, which is based on the theory of radical theory and other theories. To test and analyze the influence of equity incentive on earnings management, to promote the implementation of equity incentive and the regulation of earnings management of SMEs board listed companies. Put forward feasible suggestions to promote the healthy and stable development of SME board listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【参考文献】