证券监管处罚、公司印象管理与CEO过度投资

发布时间：2018-02-16 05:03

本文关键词： 证券监管声誉机制 CEO 过度投资　出处：《经济管理》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：证券监管处罚作为公司外生冲击事件,直接或间接影响违规公司未来的会计与财务行为。本文选取2006—2014年中国A股上市公司违规监管数据为研究样本,基于行为金融学理论,从声誉修复角度考察证券监管处罚对违规公司投资行为的影响。研究发现:(1)与未受处罚的公司相比,违规公司被处罚后倾向于过度投资,通过激进的投资行为对冲处罚的负面影响,借以修复公司受损形象,但导致公司投资效率下降,损害投资者利益;(2)CEO学历水平越高,上述现象越严重;(3)公司内部治理机制并未能有效约束高学历CEO的刺激反应。最后,使用匹配后双重差值分析、样本自抽样回归分析,以及不同子样本、不同匹配变量多重检验分析后,结果一致稳健。本文立足企业微观经济行为,拓展了证券监管处罚经济后果的研究视角。
[Abstract]:As an exogenous event, securities regulatory punishment directly or indirectly affects the future accounting and financial behavior of the offending companies. This paper selects the regulatory data of China A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2014 as the research sample, based on behavioral finance theory. From the perspective of reputation repair, we investigate the impact of securities regulatory penalties on the investment behavior of illegal companies. The study found that: 1) compared with those companies that have not been penalized, the offending companies tend to overinvest after being punished. The negative effects of hedging penalties through aggressive investment behavior are used to repair the damaged image of the company, but the lower the investment efficiency of the company, the higher the level of CEO education at the expense of investors. The more serious the above phenomenon is, the more serious the company's internal governance mechanism does not effectively restrain the stimulatory response of the highly educated CEO. Finally, the use of matching double difference analysis, sample self-sampling regression analysis, and different sub-samples, The results are consistent and robust after multiple test and analysis of different matching variables. Based on the microeconomic behavior of enterprises, this paper expands the research perspective of the economic consequences of securities regulatory penalties.
【作者单位】：广东财经大学会计学院;中山大学管理学院;广东工业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“公司治理与企业家的主观幸福感研究”(71272201)
【分类号】：F272.91;F275;F832.51

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