创业板上市公司高管增减持对盈余管理影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-22 05:28

本文选题：创业板上市公司　切入点：高管　出处：《沈阳理工大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：创业板上市公司于2009年10月30日在深圳证券交易所正式启动,与A股主板市场相比,创业板上市公司发展呈现高股价和高市盈率以及高风险的特点。同时创业板上市公司在资产要求、高管胜任能力的要求、筹集资金用途方面以及信息披露等方面条件较低,但是它的运作要求以及审核程序比较严格。同时,创业板上市公司高管大规模地增减持活动的现象,引起不少人的关注。本文以委托代理理论、内部人交易理论、信息不对称理论、剩余控制权理论为基础来研究创业板上市公司高管增减持对盈余管理的影响。本文以2014年12月31日以前上市的创业板公司为样本,以2012年至2015年发生高管增减持的1054个增减持事件为研究窗口,从增减持规模、增减持市值、市盈率的角度检验了盈余管理的存在性以及增减持时盈余管理的方向性、盈余管理程度以及盈余管理动机,实证结果表明:(1)创业板上市公司高管增减持时,前期存在盈余管理的现象,增持时进行向下的盈余管理,减持时进行向上的盈余管理。(2)创业板上市公司高管增持规模与盈余管理的关系不显著,减持规模越大,向上进行盈余管理的程度越大。(3)创业板上市公司高管增减持市值与综合真实活动盈余管理负相关,增持市值越大,高管进行向下盈余管理的程度越大;由于本文减持市值用负数表示,减持市值越大,企业进行向上的综合真实活动盈余管理程度越大。(4)创业板上市公司高管增减持时,市盈率与综合真实盈余管理负相关。增持时,市盈率越大,创业板上市公司进行向下盈余管理的动机越大;减持时,市盈率越小,创业板上市公司进行向上盈余管理的动机越大。本文为创业板上市公司高管增减持与盈余管理的关系提供一定的理论基础。该项研究的政策意义包括监管部门需要从制度上降低上市公司操纵盈余的空间、尽快建立高管减持的预披露制度和对投资者加强教育,使创业板的股价逐步回归到合理水平,以便从根本上消除高管人员急于套现的问题。
[Abstract]:The gem listed companies were officially launched on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on October 30, 2009. The development of gem listed companies presents the characteristics of high stock price, high price-earnings ratio and high risk. At the same time, gem listed companies have lower requirements in terms of asset requirements, executive competency requirements, use of fund-raising funds and information disclosure, etc. However, its operational requirements and audit procedures are relatively strict. At the same time, the phenomenon of large scale increase and decrease of holding activities by executives of listed companies on the gem has attracted many people's attention. In this paper, the principal-agent theory, insider trading theory, Based on information asymmetry theory and residual control theory, this paper studies the influence of growth and decrease of gem executives on earnings management. This paper takes gem listed before December 31, 2014 as a sample. Taking 1054 increasing and decreasing events of senior management from 2012 to 2015 as the window of study, this paper tests the existence of earnings management and the directivity of earnings management when increasing or decreasing holdings, from the perspective of increasing or decreasing holding scale, increasing or decreasing holding market value, and price-earnings ratio. The empirical results show that there is a phenomenon of earnings management in the early stage when executives increase or decrease their holdings on the gem, and the earnings management is downward when they increase their holdings. There is no significant relationship between the scale of the increase of the senior executives' holding and the earnings management, and the larger the scale of the reduction, the larger the scale of the reduction. The greater the degree of upward earnings management is, the greater is the negative correlation between the increase and decrease of senior executives' holding on the gem and the earnings management of comprehensive real activities, the greater the increase in the holding of market value, the greater the degree of downward earnings management; Because this article reduces market value to express in a negative number, the bigger the reduction of market value, the bigger the earnings management degree of the enterprise carries on the upward synthesis real activity. (4) when the gem listed company executives increase or decrease, the price-earnings ratio is negatively correlated with the comprehensive real earnings management. The bigger the price-earnings ratio, the greater the motivation of downward earnings management for gem listed companies, and the smaller the price-earnings ratio of listed companies is when they reduce their holdings. The motivation of upward earnings management for gem listed companies is greater. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the relationship between the increase and decrease of gem executives' holdings and earnings management. The policy significance of this study includes the need for regulatory authorities to. It is necessary to reduce the scope for listed companies to manipulate earnings from an institutional perspective. As soon as possible, we will establish a pre-disclosure system for senior executives to reduce their holdings and strengthen the education of investors, so that the share prices of the gem will gradually return to a reasonable level, so as to fundamentally eliminate the problem of executives eager to cash in.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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