中国上市公司并购主并方盈余管理研究

发布时间：2018-04-06 06:21

本文选题：上市公司兼并收购　切入点：主并方　出处：《华东师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：兼并收购作为社会资源有效配置和企业完成低成本对外扩张的重要途径,二十多年来在我国资本市场中日益活跃,在调整经济结构、淘汰落后产能、提升行业集中度、深化国有企业改革和加快民营企业发展等方面发挥着重要作用。一方面,交易方式的日渐丰富和监管政策的逐步完善,为兼并收购的快速发展提供了沃土;另一方面,我国IPO业务的几次暂停迫使许多排队上市的企业选择了被上市公司收购这一路径来实现间接上市,这也为并购热情的持续高涨起到了助推作用。然而,事实却表明兼并收购并未能够达到应有的预期,在兼并收购完成后相当多的上市公司出现了不同程度的业绩下滑。兼并收购中可能存在的盈余管理行为引起了学者们的注意,认为其可能对并购后的业绩产生影响。因此,本文认为对上市公司兼并收购前主并方的盈余管理行为进行研究具有重要意义。本文从兼并收购和盈余管理的概念出发,回顾了国内外学者对兼并收购中盈余管理问题的研究现状,并阐述了相关理论成果。随后,在此基础上提出了两个研究假设,采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方式对我国上市公司兼并收购发生前主并方的盈余管理行为进行了研究。理论研究部分,本文站在博弈论的视角下对兼并收购中盈余管理决策的纳什均衡进行分析,得出无论在何种情况下作为"理性人"的兼并收购双方都会在自身利益最大化的驱动下选择进行盈余管理;随后通过进一步研究发现,在股份支付并购发生前主并方存在正向盈余管理动机,而在现金支付并购发生前主并方则存在反向盈余管理动机。而实证研究部分,本文首先在横截面修正Jones模型中加入两个变量对其进行改良,然后用改良后的该模型和真实盈余管理模型对2014-2015年度我国A股市场上发生重大资产重组事项的主并方进行实证研究,结果表明主并方在兼并收购发生前同时进行了真实和应计两种盈余管理,且支付方式对盈余管理方向产生影响。最后,通过对比横截面修正Jones模型改良前后的检验效力,证实了改良后的模型效果略优。
[Abstract]:As an important way for the effective allocation of social resources and the completion of low-cost external expansion of enterprises, mergers and acquisitions have become increasingly active in China's capital market for more than 20 years. They are adjusting the economic structure, eliminating backward production capacity, and promoting industry concentration.Deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and speeding up the development of private enterprises play an important role.On the one hand, the increasing enrichment of trading methods and the gradual improvement of regulatory policies provide fertile ground for the rapid development of mergers and acquisitions; on the other hand,Several suspensions of IPO business in China have forced many listed enterprises to choose the way of being acquired by listed companies in order to achieve indirect listing, which has also contributed to the continued upsurge of M & A enthusiasm.However, the facts show that mergers and acquisitions have not been able to meet their expectations. After the completion of mergers and acquisitions, quite a number of listed companies have seen their performance decline to varying degrees.The possible earnings management behavior in mergers and acquisitions has attracted the attention of scholars that it may have an impact on the performance of mergers and acquisitions.Therefore, it is of great significance to study the earnings management behavior of listed companies before merger and acquisition.Based on the concepts of mergers and acquisitions and earnings management, this paper reviews the current research situation of earnings management in mergers and acquisitions, and expounds the relevant theoretical results.Then, two hypotheses are put forward, and the earnings management behavior of listed companies before merger and acquisition in China is studied by combining theoretical analysis and empirical test.In the theoretical research part, this paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium of earnings management decision in mergers and acquisitions from the perspective of game theory.It is concluded that both sides of merger and acquisition as "rational people" will choose to carry out earnings management under the drive of maximizing their own interests under any circumstances; subsequently, through further research, it is found that,Before the merger and acquisition of share payment, there is a positive earnings management motive for the principal and merge party, and a reverse earnings management motive for the main and joint party before the cash payment merger and acquisition.In the empirical research part, this paper first adds two variables to the cross-section modified Jones model to improve it.Then, using the improved model and the real earnings management model, the empirical research on the major asset restructuring events occurred in China's A-share market in 2014-2015 is carried out.The results show that both real and accrual earnings management are carried out before merger and acquisition, and the way of payment has an impact on the direction of earnings management.Finally, the effectiveness of the modified Jones model is verified by comparing the effectiveness of the modified model before and after modification.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F271;F275

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